Transparency Rwanda asbl

RWANDA BRIBERY INDEX 2010

April 2011

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research is of the utmost importance for a number of reasons. First of all it represents a step forward in our understanding of the multifaceted phenomenon of corruption in Rwanda, focusing on a specific form – bribery – which is also the most common and complementing previous studies carried out by the Government and by civil society. Secondly, it provides a solid basis for continuing the fight against corruption in our country: far from thinking that the good results of the recent past are enough, this research shows that problems still exist and it indicates ways to tackle them. Finally, this report shows once again the importance of civil society's role in the fight against corruption, alongside the Government and other public institutions.

On behalf of Transparency Rwanda (TR), which promoted the research, I would like to warmly thank those who made this study possible. Let me start with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), a longstanding partner of our organisation, which funded the research. Followed by Strategic Research, the Nairobi-based consultancy firm which carried out the study, represented by the international consultant Caesar Handa. I would also like to thank Jean Bosco Binenwa, the local consultant who participated in the project.

It is equally important for me to thank TR's partners which provided valuable inputs and validated the methodology of this study, as well as TR's team which contributed to ensure the quality of the research by cooperating closely with the consultants. Special thanks also to TR's Executive Secretary, Apollinaire Mupiganyi, for his encouragement and guidance throughout the process of this research. Last but now least, I do want to explicitly thank the citizens of Rwanda for participating in the survey and providing the opinions and information which are the backbone of this report.

Marie Immaculée Ingabire
Chairperson of Transparency Rwanda

Abbreviations and Acronyms

BPI	-	Bribery Payers Index
CPI	-	Corruption Perception Index
CSO	-	Civil Society Organisation
EABI	-	East Africa Bribery Index
GCB	-	Global Corruption Barometer
JGA	-	Joint Governance Assessment
NPA	-	Norwegian People's Aid
NTB	-	National Tender Board
PPIMA	-	Public Policy Information, Monitoring and Advocacy
RPPA	-	Rwanda Public Procurement Authority
RTA	-	Refused to answer

Concepts and Definitions

Corruption: Corruption is operationally defined by Transparency International (TI) as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. TI further differentiates between "according to rule" corruption and "against the rule" corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing.

Forms of Corruption: Include, among others, bribery, extortion and the misuse of inside information. They exist where there is community indifference or a lack of enforcement policies. In societies with a culture of ritualised gift giving, the line between acceptable and unacceptable gifts is often hard to draw.

Bribe: Money or favour given or promised in order to influence the judgment or conduct of a person in a position of trust or power, or of a service deliverer.

Bribery: A form of corruption. It is an act implying money or gift given that alters the behaviour of the recipient. Bribery constitutes a crime and is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty.

CPI: Corruption Perception Index. The CPI, which is a means of measuring corruption, ranks countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The CPI is carried out every year by Transparency International. The CPI ranks almost 180 countries by their perceived levels of corruption

BPI: Bribe Payers' Index. This is another means of measuring corruption. The BPI assesses the supply side of corruption and ranks corruption by source country and industry sector.

GCB: The Global Corruption Barometer is a survey that assesses general public attitudes toward, and experience of, corruption in dozens of countries around the world.

Executive Summary

Transparency Rwanda has decided to undertake a Bribery Index survey to establish the current state of this specific form of corruption in Rwanda. The results of the survey will contribute to raising public awareness on corruption in the country. The survey was guided by the general objective of establishing experiences and perceptions of Rwandans with regard to service delivery and corruption in the country.

The survey was carried out nationally in November 2010. It employed the use of quantitative methodologies to collate views from various respondents. A total of 2,401 respondents were interviewed among the general public. A thorough desk review was also undertaken to obtain further information from other sources on corruption.

Along with a number of specific measures and indicators on the extent of bribery in the country, five specific indices have been calculated, namely: likelihood of encountering bribe occurrence, prevalence of bribery, impact of bribery, average size of bribe and share of bribery.

Highlights of the findings

The survey shows that most people in Rwanda have not witnessed bribery. In instances where bribes are demanded, they are not always paid. Institutions with the highest bribe demand occurrences are civil society, the Police and institutions at local level.

The bribery indices are as follows:

Likelihood of encountering bribe occurrence	-	3.9%
Prevalence of bribery	-	2.15%
Impact of bribery	-	1.98%
Average size of bribe	-	27,467 Rwf
Share of bribery	-	calculated per institution

The low level of bribery incidence is confirmed by the fact that most Rwandans deny having witnessed or encountered any form of corruption in the country (82% and 83% respectively). The profile of the person most likely to encounter corruption is a young, poor and little educated man. Those who do admit having witnessed corrupt practices mention bribery as the most significant form of corruption witnessed: bribery to obtain a service has been witnessed by 11% of people while bribery to secure a job has been witnessed by 3% of Rwandans.

Out of the 17% of respondents who declared they encountered corruption, the demand side appears to be the driving force in encouraging corruption, as in 69.9% of the cases corruption was demanded by the service provider while in only 7.8% of the cases was it offered by the person who needed service. This means that emphasis on interventions to fight against corruption ought to focus primarily on governance systems of institutions in Rwanda that provide leeway to corruption.

Bribe is mostly paid in form of money (94%) while in a few cases it is given through gifts (6%) and is usually paid directly to the service provider (86.7%). The average size of bribe paid in the 12 months preceding the survey by those respondents who had to pay bribes is Rwf 27,467. Almost 90% of the bribes were below Rwf 50,000 and indeed 40.5% below Rwf 5,000, showing that this survey mostly captured petty rather than grand corruption; the smallest bribe given was Rwf 200 while the biggest was worth Rwf 600,000. The highest share of all the bribes have been paid to the Police (52.3%).

Most of the people indulging in bribery are extremely satisfied with the service they get after giving bribes (74.5%). There is however a significant percentage who are extremely dissatisfied with the service (11.4%) obtained after bribing; the latter occurrence can be used to demonstrate to the public that bribery or indulgence in corruption does not always lead to satisfaction with the services rendered.

The majority of the people (78.1%) show the willingness to adapt positive actions should they encounter corruption in the future: 37% say they would refuse to pay the bribe and walk away, 5.8% would refuse and insist on service while 35.3% would take a further step reporting their corrupt experience. This is a positive outcome of the anti corruption agenda in Rwanda. However, 20.5% of respondents will still pay the bribe if they can afford it, which indicates the need to continue sensitising the population on the negative consequences of corruption.

The survey also shows that 56% of people who witness corruption do not report and the most mentioned reason why people do not report corruption is because they fear harassment and intimidation from the authorities they would report corruption to (36.5%), followed by the fear that nothing would be done. Advocacy therefore needs to be carried out on institutions to instil public confidence in their anti corruption mechanisms to encourage their usage, including by increasing the friendliness and privacy of their service as well as ensuring adequate follow up of complaints. Interestingly, more men than women are likely to take positive actions while educated people and women are less likely to report corruption practices.

The public generally think that the government is making substantial efforts in fighting against corruption but that more needs to be done (56%), though a significant proportion think that what is being is already enough (35.8%). Citizens exhibit most faith in the Police to take leadership in the fight against corruption (43.2%) followed by office of the Ombudsman (17.6%) and the Presidency (15.5%). These three institutions are therefore expected to take the lead, though an integrated effort by government, private sector and civil society is required if the fight is to be won.

1.0.0 Background

Since the 1994 genocide, the Government of Rwanda has gone through a painful process of reconstruction, including rebuilding the whole governance systems, structures and institutions. Rwanda performs relatively well in terms of government effectiveness compared to several of her neighbours. The fight against corruption is one of the Government's official priorities as stipulated in Vision 2020 and the media consistently reports on the Government's "aggressive" stand against corruption.

At the national level, the Government of Rwanda has undertaken a number of anti corruption measures to strengthen the legal and institutional framework by establishing a number of institutions such as the office of the Ombudsman. Indeed the latest East African Bribery Index lists Rwanda as the best performing country in the East African region with respect to fighting corruption. While Rwanda would be right in celebrating its achievement on this front, it is imperative that the government puts even more pressure to further reduce incidences of corruption both in the public and private sectors.

CSOs in Rwanda have found an enabling environment in fighting corruption in Rwanda due to the Government's political will in eradicating the vice. Transparency Rwanda is leading the CSO fight against corruption and is striving to raise awareness and gather interested actors around this noble mission.

Data on corruption issues in Rwanda is mostly provided by International organisations like Transparency International, The Mo Ibrahim Foundation and Global Integrity. Local evidence-based data is lacking in Rwanda and there is need for generating information at the grass root level in order to better measure the extent of corruption in the economy.

This report presents evidence-based findings of the current state of bribery in Rwanda that will contribute to raise public awareness on corruption in the country through broad dissemination of the outcomes. The data gathered on the state of corruption will also allow TR to develop specific advocacy activities aimed at strengthening national actions against corruption.

1.1.0 Objectives of the survey

The overall objective of the study was to establish the experiences and perceptions of Rwandans with regard to service delivery and corruption in the country. The study sought to establish the extent of bribery in Rwanda by seeking information from Rwandans on where bribery was demanded from them when seeking services, on whether they paid the demanded bribes and the nature and amount of such bribes.

The specific objectives of the survey were as to:

1. Determine the prevalence (evidence and perception) of corruption in Rwanda as reported by Rwandan households;
2. Identify Rwandan institutions and organisations particularly vulnerable to corruption;
3. Assess the impact of corruption on service delivery in Rwanda;
4. Gather concrete information on the size of bribes paid by Rwandan citizens while seeking to access a specific service.

2.0.0 Methodology of Survey

This section of the report presents the methodology used for the survey that led to the findings. Considering the quality of information required, the target group and other statistical implications, the survey used a combination of desk research and quantitative research methodologies to meet the stated study objectives. The desk study provided the background information to the study while the quantitative phase provided the information that allowed for the computation of the magnitude of the problem of corruption in Rwanda.

2.1.0 Desk study

The desk research involved taking a comprehensive review of relevant literature pertaining to corruption in Rwanda and indeed East Africa. It involved assessing documented material on corruption in the country and in the region to provide insight. The desk study was employed to obtain secondary data that was used to develop the final instruments for the survey.

The information captured in the desk study was instrumental in the formulation of the study tools for this survey. Sources of information on corruption included research organisations as well as other Government and international agencies that have been involved in the fight against corruption locally and internationally.

2.2.0 The survey

The quantitative phase was important as it allowed for the comprehensive accumulation and aggregation of statistical data on corruption in the country. Such data was analysed and interpreted to provide the situation of corruption in Rwanda. The statistical representation also allowed for segmentation and sub cluster analysis of the data collected. The study used face-to-face interviews to solicit for information.

2.2.1 Target respondents and sample frame

Rwandans aged 18 years and above were targeted in the survey. While corruption affects both young and old, it was agreed at the inception of the survey that the level of interaction with government institutions and likelihood of experiencing demands for bribes is more with adults than the younger population.

Given the need to capture a representative sample of adult Rwandans, the most appropriate, reliable and current sample frame at the time of the survey was the registered voters according the figures released by National Electoral Commission in 2010.

2.2.2 Sampling

The sample was calculated using the formula below.

n = (N(zs/e)2)/(N-1+(zs/e)2)

Where:
z= 1.96 for 95% level of confidence
s = p(1-p)   p = estimated proportion
e = desired margin of error
N = population size

In this estimation the confidence level is taken as 95% with a margin of error of 2%. As a result, a sample size of 2,401 respondents was used in the survey. The sample provided an adequate figure for undertaking statistical analysis that falls within the defined confidence levels.

2.2.3 Sample allocation and distribution

The sample was distributed proportionately based on the total population aged 18+ and corresponding to the data issued by the Electoral Commission in 2010. The statistical unit of the survey was the village. As per the geographical scope, all five Provinces were included in the survey; only eleven Districts (the basic administrative unit in the country) were selected, using a combination of random and purposive sampling technique, to capture all potential interactions in cities and border areas. The sample size in each District was proportional to the population size of the District itself. This is described below:

Table 1: District sample allocation

Province	District	Population 18+	Sample	Number of villages
Kigali		**611432**	**284**	
	Nyarungere	168198	79	8
	Gasabo	271770	126	12
	Kicuriko	171464	79	8
South		**1265365**	**589**	
	Huye	168020	292	29
	Kamonyi	170549	297	29
West		**1216367**	**566**	
	Rubavu	191463	302	30
	Ngororero	168038	264	26
North		**882600**	**412**	
	Rulindo	150098	176	17
	Gicumbi	199999	236	23
East		**1181011**	**550**	
	Nyagatare	192608	297	30
	Kirehe	163481	253	25
Total			**2401**	**241**

Household Selection

The household selection was done using the 'random route' selection process. The interviewer was given a "starting point" at which to call. In urban areas where town maps are available, the starting points were identified and the rule of 'keeping left' applied. Interviews were undertaken with the head of household in the selected house or next available decision maker in the home. Once a successful interview had been achieved, the interviewer skipped five houses, and then started calling on homes again.

2.2.4 Survey Instrument

The instrument used for the survey was a questionnaire with both closed and open ended questions which was administered face to face. The questionnaire contained both numeric and category questions and had both multiple and dichotomous responses.

Pre-testing of the questionnaire was conducted after the training to ascertain the effectiveness of the exercise besides providing a chance for the revision of the instrument.

2.2.5 Calculating the bribery indicators

Three key bribery indicators were calculated as follows:

1. Likelihood = $\dfrac{\text{\# of bribe demand situation for organisation x}}{\text{\# of interactions for organisation x}}$

2. Prevalence = $\dfrac{\text{\# of bribe payers for organisation x}}{\text{\# of interactions for organisation x}}$

3. Impact = $\dfrac{\text{\# of service deliveries as a result of bribe paying for organisation x}}{\text{\# of interactions for organisation x}}$

4. Average size = $\dfrac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in organisation x}}{\text{\# of people who paid a bribe in organisation x.}}$

5. Share = $\dfrac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in organisation x}}{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in all organisations}}$

3.0.0 Literature Review

Rwanda has made significant steps in the fight against corruption, as demonstrated by a number of achievements. Firstly, the Government has created some new institutions such as the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority (RPPA), the Office of the Auditor General, the Ombudsman's Office, the Anti-Corruption Unit in the Rwanda Revenue Authority, the Rwanda Development Board, the National Bureau of Standards in charge of the quality of different types of importation in the country and the National Examinations Council which prepares and corrects different tests.

Moreover, an independent Public Procurement Appeals Commission has been set up with the power to review RPPA decisions if they are contrary to the law on procurement contracts. The appeals commission is made up of five members – two from the Government and three from civil society, with the latter's inclusion raising hopes that the commission's decisions will be more credible. Before being replaced, the National Tender Board had been both judge and party in cases of objections related to tenders.

Secondly, several laws have been put in place in order to fight against corruption, particularly the Law n° 23/2003 approved on 07/08/2003 on prevention and repression of corruption and related offences. The penal code also shows the commitment to fight against corruption in articles 220-227. Other laws concerning specific bodies or sectors also include measures to prevent and fight corruption, such as the regulation of the Chamber of Deputies (article 38, Organic Law n° 06/2006) and of political parties (Organic Law n° 16/2003) as well as the deontological code of journalists and media.

On 15 January 2008 the Ministerial Order 001/08/10/min was issued to regulate public procurement and calls for tender. The order provides a legal framework on standards for calls for tender, to prevent biased awarding that favours one or more parties to a public contract. Recommendations were made during a retreat of Rwandan political leaders held under the direction of President Paul Kagame in February 2008, including a demand that national integrity institutions without a code of conduct adopt one as soon as possible.

Moreover, Rwanda has signed and ratified several international conventions including the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the African Union Anti-corruption Convention and the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crimes on 4th October 2006, 19th December 2003 and 26th September 2003 respectively.

Rwanda has been identified as the best performing country in the East Africa region as well as one of the top 10 performers in Africa when it comes to corruption control. The globally recognised corruption measures i.e. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index and East African Bribery Index have in the recent past revealed that Rwanda is the best performing country compared to Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi and is ranked 9th in the African continent. This is illustrated in the following tables.

Table 2: EABI and CPI 2010

Country	East Africa Bribery Index (EABI -2010) – Corruption prevalence %	Corruption Perception Index (CPI-2010) – score
Rwanda	6.6%	4.0
Tanzania	28.6%	2.7
Kenya	31.9%	2.1
Uganda	33.0%	2.5
Burundi	36.7%	1.8

Source: East Africa Bribery Index 2010 and CPI 2010

Table 3: CPI 2010, Top 10 African performers

Top 10 African countries	CPI 2010 score	Ranking
Botswana	5.8	33
Mauritius	5.4	39
Cape Verde	5.1	45
Seychelles	4.8	49
South Africa	4.5	54
Namibia	4.4	56
Tunisia	4.3	59
Ghana	4.1	62
Rwanda	4.0	66
Lesotho	3.5	78

Source: CPI 2010

The political will to fight corruption has been demonstrated by consistent policies and efforts to combat corruption in the country. Both members of the political elite and simple civil servants have been prosecuted when allegations of corruption were brought against them. There have been several cases of high-ranking officials being forced to resign, dismissed or prosecuted when involved in corruption cases.

However, in spite of these efforts, corruption is still prevalent in the country and there have been instances of tax and public funds embezzlement, fraudulent procurement practices, judicial corruption as well as high ranking officials involved in corrupt practices. Sectors most affected by corruption include the judiciary, public finance management, public administration and public procurement.

While corruption prevalence in Rwanda is the lowest in the East African states, corruption is nevertheless still apparent even though it is in lower levels compared to its counterparts. As per the records of the prosecutor general, in 2010, out of 12 districts, there were 114 reported corruption cases out of which 47 were referred to the courts for prosecution and determination. Out of the 47 court cases, 2 were closed and 6 transferred elsewhere while 39 still remain pending in the courts.

These statistics show low percentages of conclusion of corruption cases in the courts. Prosecution of corruption suspects is evidently a challenge in Rwanda like in other States in Africa. Reasons given for this range from congestions in the courts to the small number of Rwandans who are ready to be witnesses in corruption cases. As shall be demonstrated by the study findings, a majority of those who witness corruption are not ready to pursue the cases for various reasons, particularly the fear of intimidation and harassment by authorities.

This, in effect, erodes public confidence in reporting corrupt practices that they witness or encounter.

Institutional vulnerability to corruption is measured by the degree of corruption that occurs in a certain institution. Rwandan institutions that deliver services to the public experience varying intensities of vulnerability to corruption. Records from the prosecutor general in Rwanda indicate that in 2010 there were 121 cases of embezzlement in institutions reported in 12 districts. Out of the 121 cases, 35 were sent to court for prosecution, 11 cases have been closed and 3 transferred elsewhere. The other 72 cases are still pending without any action taken. Putting in place measures that would ensure speedy and proper conclusion of corruption cases will therefore contribute to boost the fight against the vice in Rwanda.

4.0.0 Findings

This section presents the findings of the survey. It includes analysis and interpretation of primary data collected and desk material reviewed to answer the objectives of the survey. The section is divided into thematic subsections responding to each specific objective of the survey. Subtopics presented are as follows:

i) Respondent demographics
ii) Corruption prevalence
iii) Institutions and organisations vulnerable to corruption
iv) Impact of corruption
v) Public perception of anticorruption mechanisms

4.1.0 Respondents Demographics

Demographics of the respondents selected to participate in the survey reflects the demographics of the Rwandan population further vindicating the sampling process used in the study. Key demographic variables in consideration are age, gender, level of education and income. Such characteristics of the population aid in further understanding respondents' motivation and in interpreting their perceptions hence consequently design interventions that respond to particular homogeneous groups of a population. Cross analysis of main findings of the survey are therefore based on these demographics of the population of Rwanda.

4.1.1 Age

Fig 1: Age of respondents

The sample consists of predominantly young population in the age group of 18 to 35 that is reflective of Rwanda population. The age group with the highest concentration is 26-35 years which makes up 34.6% of the respondents while the lowest is above 56 years which consist of 8.4% of the respondents.

4.1.2 Gender

Fig 2: Gender of respondents

Male respondents are slightly more (56%) than the female respondents (44%). This is explained by the fact that, in most instances, females are less responsive to strangers and are more likely to prefer their male counterparts to answer questions, especially those that touch on interactions with Government institutions. Males are also more likely than females to represent households in seeking services at government institutions.

4.1.3 Level of Education

Fig 3: Level of education of respondents

Most of the respondents have basic level education, again reflective of the population of Rwanda. 60.9% of respondents have primary level education. However significant minorities of the population have secondary, professional and tertiary level education (19.3%, 6.8% and 3% of respondents respectively). This population characteristic should inform modes of communication in intervention strategies used in outreach to the general public. Levels of literacy will determine the message design to increase message intake in intervention campaigns.

4.1.4 Income Level of Respondents

Fig 4: Income level of respondents

Most respondents (75.7%) have a household income of less than 35,000 Rwf per month. This is a low income group that is indicative of an economy still under recovery. Most of the population is struggling to eke a living. This is significant given that corruption tends to affect disproportionally a country's poorest population. The need therefore to cushion the population against demands for bribes is imperative.

4.1.5 Occupation of Respondents

Fig 5: Occupation of respondents

More than half of respondents are farmers (61.9%), meaning that most respondents live in rural areas. All other categories are much less represented in the sample. This result obviously has an impact on the nature and frequency of interactions that the respondents have with different institutions and individuals.

The demographic characteristics of respondents clearly indicates that very few high officials have participated in the survey, as most respondents have a limited income, have only primary education and work as farmers. This in turn means that most bribe occurrences analysed in this study belong to the so-called petty corruption rather than to the grand corruption.

4.2.0 Corruption Prevalence

The survey sought the current status of corruption prevalence in Rwanda. Among the forms of corruption known to the public, the exchange of money features prominently. In some instances, it is mentioned alongside other exchanges like sex, livestock and other favours provided by service seekers in exchange for service provision. Respondents' perceptions and reactions to corrupt practices are therefore based on this understanding of manifestations of corruption. The survey therefore went further to investigate the forms of corruption the public had witnessed and also those they had encountered. These variables present the corruption prevalence in Rwanda as described in the sub sections below.

4.2.1 Corruption Witnessed

Respondents were asked what corrupt practices they had witnessed in Rwanda. This included corruption that did not necessarily involve the respondent but one which they could attest to its occurrence. The figure below presents the outcome.

Fig 6: Corruption witnessed

Most people deny having witnessed corrupt practices in Rwanda (82%). This could imply that there is very little corruption known in Rwanda or that the public are reluctant to reveal the corruption cases they have witnessed. For the public who admit to have witnessed corrupt practices, the most significant form of corruption witnessed is bribery. Bribery to obtain service is witnessed by 11% of the people while bribery to secure a job is witnessed by 3% of them. Corruption manifest to the public is therefore tied to access to services and opportunities.

4.2.2 Corruption Encountered

Actual corrupt practices encountered by the public were established by the survey. This referred to the actual experiences of corrupt practices by the respondents. The figure below shows the percentages of people who have encountered corruption in Rwanda.

Fig 7: Corruption encountered

Only 17% of the respondents have encountered corrupt practices compared to 83% who have not. These statistics are similar to those related to the people who have not witnessed corruption (fig 6). Again, this result could imply that there is very little corruption in the country but also that some people are reluctant to reveal the cases they have encountered.

The finding on corruption encountered was disaggregated by gender, education, age and income of respondents to determine any variation in outcome among the different demographics. The following table presents the outcome.

Table 4: Corruption encounter: segregation by demographics of population

Level of Education	Encountered corruption %		Age	Encountered corruption %
Primary	55.9		18-25	25.0
Post Primary	10.1		26-35	39.1
Secondary	22.5		36-45	16.3
Tertiary / University	3.5		46-55	11.9
Not specified	7.9		56& above	7.7
Total	**100.0**		**Total**	**100.0**
Income			**Gender**	
<35,000	68.1		Male	64.6
35,000-69,999	20.8		Female	33.7
70,000-174,999	6.9		Not specified	1.7
175,000-349,999	2.2		**Total**	**100.0**
350,000-699,999	0.7			
700,000-1,056,999	0.0			
>1,057,000	0.2			
Not specified	1.0			
Total	**100.0**			

The analysis reveals that educated people are less likely to encounter corruption: those with tertiary or university education are those who encounter the least corruption (3.5%) while those with primary education encounter the most corruption (55.9%). An even stronger link is found with income, as the likelihood to encounter corruption is the highest for people whose income is the smallest and decreases for those whose income is higher. In terms of age, Rwandans who are aged 36 and above are clearly less likely to encounter corruption than their younger fellow citizens, with the 26-35 age bracket being the most at risk. Finally, men are clearly more exposed to corruption than women. As a consequence, the profile of the person most likely to encounter corruption is a young, poor and uneducated man.

In instances where the public encounter corruption, the demand side of corruption appears to be the driving force in encouraging corruption, as shown in the figure below.

Fig 8: Bribes demanded and offered

Out of the 17% of respondents who declared they encountered corruption (fig. 7), in 69.9% of the instances the undue favour leading to manifestation of corruption was demanded while in only 7.8% of the cases was it offered by the person to access a needed service. This means that emphasis on intervention of corruption ought to focus on governance systems of institutions in Rwanda that provide leeway to corruption.

4.2.2.1 Reasons for Corruption

To explore further the circumstances surrounding the corruption occurrence and encounter, respondents were asked about the purpose of inducement. As observed earlier, bribery for purposes of obtaining service is how corruption mostly manifests itself.

Fig 9: Reasons for corruption

Need to access services is the main reason of corruption as attested by 30.7% of the people who encountered corruption. "Services" referred to gaining access to daily utility needs like healthcare, education, paying bills among others. Bribing to get employment is mentioned by 12.9% of the people as the second most common reason of corruption in Rwanda. In this case inducement was present to influence the person gaining employment in a particular institution. Other reasons less mentioned though still significantly expressed are payment of bribes to avoid law enforcement (9%), issues surrounding conformity to regulation (8.1%) and business-related procedures (6.2%). The law enforcement bribery occurrences mostly involved interaction with the Police while conformity to regulation involved issues of acquiring various licenses and legal requirements for business operation.

4.2.2.2 Citizens' Interactions with Institutions

Corruption practices can only take place during interactions with institutions, organisations or individuals. For this reason it is important to provide information on the frequency of citizens' interactions with such institutions, as indicated in the table below.

Table 5: Citizens' interactions with institutions

	Institutions	Frequency	Percentage
1	Sector institutions	5044	30.4
2	Cell institutions	3368	20.3
3	Banks	1933	11.7
4	Health institutions	1616	9.7
5	Village institutions	1152	6.9
6	District institutions	893	5.4
7	Police	817	4.9
8	Private sector	469	2.8
9	Education sector	468	2.8
10	Rwanda Revenue Authority	333	2
11	Justice sector	164	0.9
12	Conciliators	140	0.8
13	Civil Society	119	0.7
14	RECO RWASCO[1]	47	0.3
15	Local defence	18	0.1
	Total	**16 581**	**100**

It was established that there were a total of 16,581 interactions by respondents with different institutions in Rwanda in the last 12 months. Some of the institutions were grouped into: health institutions (hospitals, health centres, pharmacies and so on), education sector (schools, universities), Rwanda Revenue Authority (which includes customs), Police (including all Police departments and services), and Justice sector (judges and all different Courts).

The findings show that the institutions with the most citizens' interactions are those at the local government level, primarily the Sector institutions followed by the Cell institutions, while banks (including the so-called *banques populaires* which are widespread in rural areas) come immediately after. On the other hand, Reco Rwasco and local defences register a very limited frequency of interactions with citizens: in the case of the former, this is probably a consequence of the fact that more than half of respondents are employed as farmers (as mentioned in fig. 5) and thus live in rural areas where interactions with electricity suppliers

[1] *RECO RWASCO has in the meantime become EWASA.*

are very limited, while in the case of the latter this is probably due to the fact that citizens usually do not address local defence directly but tend to contact local authorities first and then it is up to the village institutions to involve the local defences if needed.

4.2.3 Forms and Means of Bribery

The survey asked respondents to indicate the forms and means in which they have encountered bribery. The following paragraphs present the results.

4.2.3.1 Forms of Bribery

Most of the bribes paid were in the form of actual cash. Forms of bribery paid are as presented in the figure below.

Fig 10: Forms of bribery

The figures shows that bribes are mostly paid in the form of money (94%) while in a few of the cases where it is demanded or offered, it is indirectly given through gifts (6%).

4.2.3.2 Means of Paying Bribe

In order to understand further how the exchange took place, respondents were asked how the bribe demanded and / or offered changed hands. The figure below presents the outcome.

Table 6: Bribe demand occurrences

	Institutions	Number of bribe demand occurrences
1	Cell institutions	70
2	Police	50
3	Village institutions	48
4	Sector institutions	45
5	Civil Society	20
6	District offices	15
7	Private Sector	14
8	Local Defence	13
9	Conciliators	9
10	Customs	8
11	Schools	8
12	Courts	8
13	RECO RWASCO	6
14	Banks	6
15	Health institutions	1
	Total	**321**

Out of 16,581 institutional interactions, there were 321 bribe demand occurrences. Institutions with the highest demand occurrences are Cell institutions followed by the Police and Village institutions with 70, 50 and 48 bribe demand situations respectively.

As shown in table 5, the Cell institutions had the second highest level of interaction with the public, suggesting interrelationship between level of bribe demand occurrences and public institutional interactions. However the Police and Village institutions registered a lower level of interaction, implying that other factors influence the bribery incidence beyond the number of interactions.

It is also important to highlight the presence of civil society and private sector institutions among the institutions with the highest bribe demand occurrences after the decentralised bodies and the Police; this clearly shows the need to adopt a broad approach to anti-corruption rather than only focus on Government institutions.

4.3.2 Institutions with bribe offer occurrences

The survey further established the institutions with bribery offer situations, in other words the cases in which the bribe was offered (and paid) by the client or service seeker. The following table presents the outcome.

Table 7: Bribe offer occurrences

	Institutions	Number of bribe offer occurrences
1	Cell institutions	8
2	Police	7
3	Sector institutions	7
4	District offices	4
5	Schools	3
6	Conciliators	2
7	Banks	1
8	Village institutions	1
9	Customs	1
10	Local Defence	1
11	Private Sector	1
12	Health institutions	0
13	Reco Rwasco	0
14	Courts	0
15	Civil society	0
	Total	**36**

There were a total of 36 bribery offer occurrences in the institutions with the Cell, Police and Sector institutions having the highest occurrence of 8, 7 and 7 respectively. Relationship between bribe demand and bribe paying is again revealed in this finding. Institutions that have higher bribe demand occurrences are more likely to experience offer occurrences than institutions with lower bribe demand occurrences.

Again it is worth highlighting that the number of bribes offered is significantly lower than the number of bribes demanded. This shows that, given the current strong political will to fight corruption in the country, citizens are reluctant to offer bribes (or to admit that they have offered bribes) because they fear the consequences or because they have been sensitised on the negative effects of corruption. However it is also important to highlight that it is easier to reveal that someone else requested a bribe rather than acknowledging that it is yourself who offered the bribe.

4.3.3 Amounts of bribes paid in institutions

The survey established amounts of bribe actually paid in the institutions that reported bribe paying occurrences, both when bribes were demanded and when they were offered. The outcome is as revealed in table below.

Table 8: Amounts of bribes paid per institution

Organisation / Institution	% of bribes paid per institutions								Total
	<= 5000 Rwf	5001-10000 Rwf	10001-20000 Rwf	20001-50000 Rwf	50 001-100 000 Rwf	100 001-200 000 Rwf	200 001-300 000 Rwf	>= 300 001 Rwf	
Police	7.9	2.6	6.2	6.2	2.2	1.3	1.8	0.9	29.1
Cell	5.3	5.7	2.6	2.6	0	0.4	0	0	16.7
Sector	7.9	2.6	3.1	1.3	0.4	0	0	0	15.4
Village	11	1.8	0.9	0	0.9	0	0	0	14.5
Private sector institutions	2.6	0.9	0.9	1.3	0.9	0	0	0	6.6
Schools	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.4	0	0	0	0	3.1
Local defence	1.8	0.4	0	0.4	0.4	0	0	0	3.1
Conciliators	0	1.3	0.9	0.4	0	0	0	0	2.6
Civil society	1.8	0.4	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	2.6
District	0.9	0	0	0.9	0.4	0	0	0	2.2
Bank	0.4	0	0.4	0	0.4	0.9	0	0	2.2
Health institutions	0	0	0	0.4	0	0	0	0	0.4
Reco Rwasco	0	0	0	0	0.4	0	0	0	0.4
Customs	0	0	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0.4
Court	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0	0.4
Total	40.5	16.7	16.7	14.1	6.2	2.6	2.2	0.9	100

The table shows that almost 90% of the bribes paid were below Rwf 50,000 and indeed 40.5% were below Rwf 5,000, which confirms once again that this survey has mostly captured petty corruption. In particular, the smallest bribes mostly affected the Village institutions, followed by the Police, Sector and Cell institutions. It is also important to highlight that the Police registered the highest proportion of the bribes paid with 29.1%, again followed by the local government institutions.

4.3.4 Bribery Indices

Bribery indices were calculated from the result of institutions with bribe demand and paying occurrences as well as amounts of bribe paid. All these were compared to the number of interactions with the institutions. This has permitted to derive five main indices i.e. likelihood of encountering bribe demand occurrence, prevalence of bribery, impact of bribery, average size of bribe and share of bribery. These were calculated using simple formulas as below:

ı)   Likelihood of encountering bribe demand occurrence = No. of bribe demand situations X100

_____

No. of interactions

ii)   Prevalence of bribery = No. of bribe paying situations X 100

$$\frac{\text{No. of bribe paying situations} \times 100}{\text{No. of interactions}}$$

iii)   Impact of bribery = No. of service deliveries as result of paying bribe X100

$$\frac{\text{No. of service deliveries as result of paying bribe} \times 100}{\text{No. of interactions}}$$

iv)   Average size of bribe = Total amount of bribes paid in organisation x

$$\frac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in organisation x}}{\text{No of people who paid a bribe in organisation x.}}$$

v)   Share of bribery **=** Total amount of bribes paid in organisation x

$$\frac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in organisation x}}{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in all organisations}}$$

4.3.6.1 Likelihood of encountering bribe demand occurrences

Likelihood of encountering bribe occurrence =   No. of bribe demand situations X 100

$$\frac{\text{No. of bribe demand situations} \times 100}{\text{No. of interactions}}$$

Table 9: Likelihood of encountering bribe demand occurrence

Institution / Indicators	No. of interactions	No. of bribe demand occurrences	Likelihood of encountering bribe demand occurrence - %
Civil Society	119	20	16.8
Conciliators	140	9	6.4
Police	817	50	6.1
Justice sector	164	8	4.8
Village institutions	1152	48	4.1
Private sector	469	14	3.4
Rwanda Revenue Authority	333	8	2.4
Cell institutions	3368	70	2.1
District institutions	893	15	1.7
Education sector	468	8	1.7
Sector institutions	5044	45	0.8
Banks	1933	6	0.3
Health institutions	1616	1	0.1
Reco Rwasco	47	6	
Local defence	18	13	
Total	16581	321	
Bribery index (Average)			**3.9%**

The likelihood of encountering bribery demand situations in Rwandan institutions is 3.9% as indicated in the table above. Institutions with which citizens had less than 50 interactions (Reco Rwasco and local defence) are not considered in this analysis, though it is worth mentioning that some cases of bribery were reported. The institution with the highest likelihood of encountering bribe demand occurrences is civil society (16.8%), followed by

conciliators (6.4%) and the Police (6.1%), while health institutions have the least likelihood of encountering bribe demand occurrences with 0.1%. The likelihood of being asked a bribe in the Rwandan institutions that have been surveyed is therefore very low.

When comparing this data with table 6 (bribe demand occurrences) some differences can be identified: the institutions with the highest number of bribe demands (Cell institutions and Police) are not those with the highest demand index when the number of interactions is taken into account. The institutions with the highest index are therefore those where the number of demands is the closest to the number of interactions.

4.3.6.2 Prevalence of bribery

Prevalence of bribery = No. of bribe paying situations X 100

_____

No. of interactions

Table 10: Prevalence of bribery

Institution / Indicators	No. of interactions	No. of bribe paying occurrences	Prevalence of bribery - %
Police	817	66	8
Civil Society	119	6	5
Conciliators	140	6	4.2
Private sector	469	15	3.2
Village institutions	1152	33	2.8
Education sector	468	7	1.4
Cell institutions	3368	38	1.1
Justice sector	164	1	0.6
Sector institutions	5044	35	0.6
District institutions	893	5	0.5
Rwanda Revenue Authority	333	1	0.3
Banks	1933	5	0.2
Health institutions	1616	1	0.1
Local defence	18	7	
RECO RWASCO	47	1	
Total	16581	227	
Bribery index (Average)			**2.15%**

Prevalence of bribery in Rwanda institutions is 2.15% as indicated in the calculation of the index in the table above; the prevalence is therefore very low. Again the institutions with less than 50 interactions have not been considered in this outcome.

Police, civil society and conciliators have the highest prevalence rate of bribery with indices of 8%, 5% and 4.2% respectively. The lowest prevalence rate is in health institutions with 0.1%. It is worth pointing out that this indicator captures the bribes actually paid by citizens to institutions, regardless whether the money was demanded by the service provider or offered by the public.

These results broadly confirm the outcome of the bribe demand occurrences, as the top three institutions are the same in both cases. However, when comparing tables 9 and 10, it is clear that more bribes are demanded by institutions than actually paid by citizens. This shows the need for the Government and particularly the institutions in charge of fighting corruption to focus their efforts in promoting integrity and accountability of the Rwandan institutions. On the other hand, as it was mentioned earlier on, it is also important to highlight that it is easier to reveal that someone else demanded a bribe rather than acknowledging that you have actually paid it; therefore the need to continue sensitising the public should not be neglected either.

4.3.6.3 Impact of bribery

Impact of bribery = No. of service deliveries as result of paying bribe X100

$$\frac{}{\text{No. of interactions}}$$

Table 11: Impact of bribery

Institution / Indicators	No. of interactions	No. of service delivery after paying bribe	Impact of bribery - %
Civil Society	119	9	7.6
Police	817	49	6
Conciliators	140	5	3.6
Village institutions	1152	19	1.6
Private sector	469	7	1.5
Justice sector	164	2	1.2
Education sector	468	5	1.1
Cell institutions	3368	32	0.9
District institutions	893	7	0.8
Rwanda Revenue Authority	333	2	0.6
Sector institutions	5044	26	0.5
Banks	1933	3	0.2
Health institutions	1616	1	0.1
Local defence	18	4	
RECO RWASCO	47	3	
Total	16581	174	
Bribery Index – Average			**1.98**

Overall impact of bribery in Rwandan institutions, as indicated in the table above, is 1.98% which again can be defined as very low. Institutions with less than 50 interactions were once again not considered in this outcome.

The institution with the highest impact of bribery is civil society with an index of 7.6%, followed by the Police and conciliators: they are again the same three institutions which have been identified as those with the highest likelihood of bribe demand and prevalence of paying. In addition to this, the Police was mentioned earlier also as the one with the highest amount of bribes paid in the last 12 months and the one with the greatest share of bribery.

The fact that some institutions score a fairly high impact of bribery means that many citizens who were not ready to pay bribes were not provided with the services they had the right to; the poor and honest citizens are thus those who suffer the most serious consequences.

4.3.6.4 Average size of bribe

It is also interesting to determine the average size of bribes paid during the last 12 months. This can be calculated with the following formula:

Average size of bribe = Total amount of bribes paid
_____
No. of people paying bribe

The results are presented in the table below.

Table 12: Average size of bribe

Institution type / Indicators	Total amt of bribe (Rwf)	No. of people paying bribes	Average size of bribe (Rwf) –
Cell institutions	607,500	38	15987
District institutions	155,000	5	31000
Banks	395,000	5	79000
Police	3,260,000	66	49394
Village institutions	335,000	33	10152
Sector institutions	420,000	35	12000
Health institutions	35,000	1	35000
Schools	90,000	7	12857
RECO RWASCO	75,000	1	75000
Customs	15,000	1	15000
Court	250,000	1	250000
Local defence	137,500	7	19643
Conciliators	87,500	6	14583
Civil society	42,500	6	7083
Private sectors institutions	330,000	15	22000
Total	**6,235,000**	**227**	**27,467**

The table shows that the average bribe paid during the last 12 months by the respondents who paid bribes is Rwf 27,467. This is a relatively high amount considered that more than half of the Rwandan population lives below the poverty line. The table also confirms that during the last 12 months the highest amount of bribes was paid to the Police; and the data provided by the respondents permit to state that, within the Police, the sections mostly affected by bribery were Brigade and Traffic Police. Interestingly, the information gathered in the survey reveal that the smallest bribe given in the last 12 months was 200 Rwf while the biggest was worth 600,000 Rwf.

4.3.6.5 Share of bribery

The survey further investigated the share of bribery, that is the amount of bribes paid in each organisation divided by the total amount of all the bribes paid according to the following formula:

Share of bribery = Total amount of bribes paid in organisation x 100
_____
Total amount of bribes paid in all organisations

Table 13: Share of bribe

Institution type / Indicators	Total amt of bribe (Rwf)	Share of bribe (%)
Police	3,260,000	52.3
Cell institutions	607,500	9.7
Sector institutions	420,000	6.7
Banks	395,000	6.3
Village institutions	335,000	5.4
Private sectors institutions	330,000	5.3
Court	250,000	4.0
District institutions	155,000	2.5
Local defence	137,500	2.2
Schools	90,000	1.4
Conciliators	87,500	1.4
Reco Rwasco	75,000	1.2
Civil society	42,500	0.7
Health institutions	35,000	0.6
Customs	15,000	0.2
Total	**6,235,000**	**100**

The highest share of bribes is with the Police. This means that out of all bribes issued by respondents, more than half were paid to Police institutions. This result confirms the findings presented in table 12 on average size of bribe, which show that the Police is the institution which received the highest amount of bribes during the 12 months preceding the survey. The Police is again followed, though at a much lower level, by local government instances such as Cell and Sector institutions.

4.3.6.6 Summary of the Indices

The indices calculated in this survey are summarised in the table below.

Table 14: Summary of bribery indices

Bribery Indicator	Index
Likelihood of encountering bribe occurrence	3.9%
Prevalence of bribery	2.15%
Impact of bribery	1.98%
Average size of bribe	27,467 Rwf
Share of bribery	Calculated per institution

Indices obtained with different methodologies cannot be compared. However, looking at other corruption-related indices can provide with some information on the level of corruption in Rwanda. The East Africa Bribery Index 2010 showed that Rwanda has a low level of corruption prevalence, with 6.6%. The difference with the 2.15% indicated in this study is probably due to some slight differences in methodology, particularly in the sampling which in the EABI case focuses more on urban areas where bribery might be higher; however both studies indicate a low prevalence. A research on governance and corruption carried out by Transparency Rwanda in 2009 indicated that 1.8% of the population paid bribes in 2007, broadly in line with the results of this survey. The Worldwide Governance Indicators by the

World Bank/Brookings Institution confirm the high political will to fight corruption in the country, with a Control of Corruption index of 98%. Finally the Corruption Perception Index 2010 (CPI) by Transparency International, even though the value for Rwanda is still fairly high at 4 out of 10 (where 10 indicates the best performers), shows that the country has improved over the last years in reducing corruption (from 2.8 in 2007).

4.4.0 Impact of Corruption

Corruption has short and long term effects in society. In the long run corruption has negative effects in the economy of a country and destroys its moral fabric. Such resultant effects of corruption include eroding the provision of essential public services, undermining democracy, harmful effects on trade, high costs of doing business, detraction of development partners and investors, deepening poverty, distorting social and economic development, inequity in distribution of resources and opportunities among other harmful effects. Corruption tends to disproportionately affect the poorest in a society, as they cannot afford paying bribes and therefore can be denied the services they have a right to. Indulgence in corruption by the citizenry is usually inspired by the desire to achieve short term solutions whereas the long term impact is often not fully appreciated by them.

The survey investigated immediate effects of corrupt practices and also resultant attitudes of the public from indulging in corrupt practices or from known effects of corrupt behaviour. The respondents were asked to rate satisfaction of service and perceptions of bribery experiences after giving inducements to receive a service.

4.4.1 Satisfaction with service after bribery

The survey investigated whether a service was delivered after paying a bribe. The table below shows the outcome.

*Table 15: Services received after paying bribe (percentage)*

Yes	7.6
No	1.4
Not applicable	91
Total	**100**

The high number of "not applicable" is explained by the fact that most respondents have declared that they did not pay bribes. Further interpreting the table above, 7.6% (or 84.4% of those who paid bribes) did receive the service after paying, while 1.4% (or 15.6% of those who paid) did not receive the service.

The quality of the service received was further rated by respondents. They were asked how satisfied they were with the service they got after paying the bribe. The figure below shows the findings.

Fig 12: Satisfaction with service after bribe

Most of the people who admitted to engaging in bribery indicate that they were extremely satisfied with the service they got after giving bribes (74.5%). There is however a significant percentage who are extremely dissatisfied with the service (11.4%) after bribing to obtain it. This may be because they feel that they deserved a service in line with the bribe they had paid.

This finding indicates different aspects of the effects of corruption. On the one hand it results in desired immediate outcome for the public i.e. receipt and satisfaction with a service which would encourage them to indulge in the practice again, but in other cases it leads to futile results. Even when a bribe is given, significant numbers of people still do not receive the service or are extremely dissatisfied with it. In the latter case, it is hoped that the practice will be discouraged in the future. Interventions here therefore ought to focus on displaying to the public the negative effects of corruption in the long run and demonstrating that corruption does not always pay off.

4.4.2 Future Actions on Corruption

The survey sought to determine the public's future actions in case they encounter corruption. When asked what they would do if they were to encounter a bribe demand situation, respondents reacted differently with most saying that they would opt to simply refuse and walk away without taking any further action. The following figure presents their responses.

Fig 13: Future action on encountering corruption

Most respondents (78.1%) would be willing to adopt positive action if they encounter corruption in the future: 37% say they would refuse to pay the bribe and walk away, 35.3% would take a step further reporting the corrupt experience while 5.8% would refuse to pay and insist on the service to be delivered. However a significant number of respondents (20.5%) are not willing to adopt any positive action as they would pay the bribe demanded if they could afford it.

The findings on future actions on encountering corruption were disaggregated by sex of respondents to analyse whether there is any interrelation. The table below presents the outcome.

Table 16: Future action on corruption disaggregated by sex (in percentage)

Level of Education / Future Action on Corruption	Pay if I can afford	Refuse to pay & go away	Refuse to pay & report	Refuse to pay and insist on service	Others	Total
Male	25.5	34.2	33.3	5.5	1.4	**100**
Female	14	40.4	38	6.2	1.1	**100**
Not specified	22.2	44.4	25.9	7.4	0	**100**

The table shows that women are more willing to take positive actions against corruption than men: 25.5% of men would pay a bribe if they can afford it compared to 14% of women, whereas more women than men declared that they would refuse to pay (84.6% compared to 73%). It is however important to restate that most Rwandan, both men and women, are more likely to refuse to pay a bribe than to pay it (as shown in fig 13).

## 4.5.0 Public Perception of Anti-corruption Mechanisms

Anti corruption mechanisms aim at the prevention, punishment and control of corruption. They also have to inspire confidence from the public to encourage their use. The survey tested the usage of available anti corruption mechanisms by the public and their perceptions and attitudes towards them.

4.5.1 Usage of Anticorruption Mechanisms

As observed in the findings, incidences of corruption encounter and witnessing by the public are less than 20% in both cases (fig 6 and 7). It was further interrogated whether Rwandan citizenry take action when they encounter and / or witness corruption incidences. The following figure shows the outcome.

Fig 14: Corruption cases reported

There are more people who do not report corruption cases encountered / witnessed than those who do so: 56% and 44% respectively. However the fact that such a significant share of Rwandan population does report corruption should be seen as an encouragement for those institutions which are engaged in the fight against this vice. This outcome could be a function of the confidence that people have in the institutions where they seek redress and the ease of accessing such institutions. When people are confident that their complaints shall be acted upon, they are more likely to report incidences of corruption. The reverse indicates lack of confidence and/or fear of retribution by the authorities or being marked and black-listed by service providers especially in village institutions where identities of those seeking services are more likely to be known to the service providers.

The table presents the variable of 'reporting corruption' cross-analysed by age and educational level of respondents.

Table 17: Corruption reporting per level of education and sex (percentage)

Level of Education / Corruption reporting	Reported	Did not report	Total	Sex / Corruption reporting	Reported	Did not report	Total
Primary	49.2	50.8	100	Male	48.1	51.9	100
Post Primary	61.5	38.5	100	Female	35.5	64.5	100
Secondary	35.9	64.1	100	Not specified	66.7	33.3	100
Tertiary / University	11.1	88.9	100				
Not specified	27.6	72.4	100				

The table shows that people with a higher level of education (secondary and tertiary) tend

not to report corruption (64.1% and 88.9% respectively). The reason is probably that the most educated people are in a position to gain from bribing and establish a connivance with the service provider, making their relationship a win-win situation. On the other hand, the less educated people usually are forced to pay a bribe in order to obtain a basic service; they do not gain any significant advantage and therefore are more likely to report the corrupt behaviour.

The table also shows that women are less likely to report corruption than men. This is partly explained by the fact that in the Rwandan traditional culture women usually hesitate to speak up and to claim for their rights.

As mentioned above (fig 14), the findings of the survey show that 56% of people who witness corruption do not report it. The figure below shows the reasons why they did not report.

*Fig 15: Reasons for not reporting cases of corruption*

The most mentioned reason why people do not report corruption is because they fear harassment and intimidation from authorities they would report corruption to (36.5%), followed by the perception that nothing would be done after reporting (21.7%) and the fear to be marked (16.9%). Advocacy therefore needs to be carried out on institutions to instil public confidence in their anti corruption mechanisms to encourage their usage. Factors like friendliness and privacy of the reporting systems ought to be given high consideration. However it is worth reminding that this question was only asked to those respondents who encountered bribery and did not report it, therefore the percentages do not reflect the view of the whole Rwandan population.

4.5.2 Perception on Leadership in Anti Corruption

The survey finally sought to determine how Rwandan citizens perceive the performance of their Government in fighting against corruption. The figure below shows the outcome.

Fig 16: Citizens' perception of the Government's performance in the fight against corruption

Rwandan citizenry generally perceive that the Government is making substantial effort in eradicating corruption but they think more needs to be done, as indicated by 56% of respondents. In addition, a significant proportion (35.8%) goes a step further and believes that enough is being done to fight corruption. However a small minority (5.2%) think that grand corruption is currently not being tackled.

Consequently, Rwandan citizens' opinions were sought on which institutions they had most faith in as leaders in the fight against corruption. The following figure displays the outcome.

Fig 17: Institutions to take leadership in anti corruption

The public exhibit most faith in Police leadership in the fight against corruption (43.2%), followed by the office of the Ombudsman (17.6%) and the Presidency (15.5%). These three institutions inspire most confidence in the public when it comes to combating corruption. It is interesting to note that the Police is at the same time one of the institutions with the highest occurrence of bribe demand and bribe offer (as indicated above in tables 6 and 7) and the one to which the highest amount of bribes was paid (table 8). This probably means that corruption in Rwanda is not institutionalised but it is rather due to individual behaviours within the institutions.

5.0.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

The fight against corruption in Rwanda remains a key feature for the achievement of Vision 2020. The Government has shown commitment in ensuring zero tolerance to corruption. Compared to neighbouring East African countries, Rwanda has performed admirably in keeping incidences of corruption to the minimum. There is, however, the realisation that corruption creeps in unnoticed if punitive measures and education of the public are not integrated in the war against the vice. The need, therefore, for the Government to work with the private sector as well as civil society organisations in the fight against corruption is urgent if the war is to be won.

From the outcome of the bribery indices, likelihood, prevalence and impact of bribery are very low. This implies that corruption in Rwanda is not really deeply rooted but it is at a stage where it can be effectively curbed before the impending vice is given space to grow.

This calls for concerted efforts by all involved actors to ensure that corruption does not creep in and affect service delivery in public and private institutions. It is important for public institutions to realise the situation of the current state of corruption and take measures to enforce anti corruption mechanisms in their systems. The Government ought to take charge of ensuring all its institutions follow the laid down systems and procedures. Civil society and private sector on their part need to fight the corruption that affects their own activities, structures and staff. However on the other hand civil society should also increase its advocacy efforts in order to improve the design and implementation of anti-corruption laws, policies and mechanisms. Such advocacy ought to target institutions and also citizens as there are two dimensions to corruption i.e. the demand and the supply side. With institutions, there ought to be concerted efforts to put pressure on the public and the private sector to improve their governance systems so that loopholes leading to corruption are sealed. Amongst the public, sustained sensitisation ought to be carried out to educate citizens on the negative effects of corruption, to empower them to demand services they rightfully deserve and to encourage them to report the cases of corruption they encounter or witness.

The study indicates that cases of witnessing and encountering bribery occurrences in Rwanda are low as over 80% of respondents do not know of any bribery occurrences in the institutions. At the same time, those who did pay bribes in the 12 months preceding the survey paid on average more than 27,000 Rwf, a significant amount in a country where more than half of the population live below the poverty line.

The study has established that the demand side of corruption is higher than the supply side i.e. institutions involved in service delivery initiate bribery situations more than the public seeking the service. This occurrence may only take place when institutions lack proper governing structures to enable fair access to services by citizens. The institutions may also lack effective anti corruption mechanisms that fail to control, prevent and punish corruption participants. Interventions would therefore call for engagement with the institutions to strengthen their governance structures, codes of conduct and service delivery mechanisms in order to seal the loopholes of corruption.

The findings have revealed that the Police is the institution to which the highest amount of bribes was paid and which accounts for more than half the share of total bribes paid; in

addition, it is among the top three institutions in terms of likelihood, prevalence and impact of bribes. The fact that the Police is involved in law enforcement means that the bribe is not just paid to access a service but also to avoid conforming to legal requirements. Interventions therefore ought to focus on raising awareness among the public about the negative and long term implications of a nation where the rule of law is not fully respected as well as on engaging with the Police to help them improve their integrity standards. At the same time, the Police is also regarded as the institution best placed to lead the fight against corruption, suggesting that citizens acknowledge that bribery is not institutionalised and that they have high expectations of their Police.

Civil society also appears as one of the institutions with the highest level of likelihood, prevalence and impact of bribes, showing an urgent need for these organisations to focus on their own practices; introduction of codes of conduct, sensitisation of staff and establishment of reporting mechanisms are among the measures which should be taken to increase civil society's integrity.

Conciliators are also at the top of the three indices, while local government institutions (particularly at Cell and Sector levels) account for the highest share of bribery after the Police. This seems to show a certain gap between the Government's efforts in fighting corruption and the actual situation at the local level.

It is also revealed that young, poor and little educated people are more likely to encounter corruption and the fact that villages are characterised by lower literacy levels than urban centres seems to corroborate this occurrence. It is therefore important to carry out outreach to the public at grassroots levels on the quality of service delivery expectations and the need for resisting bribery attempts in order to reverse this trend.

The study shows that indulgence in corruption does not always guarantee access to service. In some cases the quality of service is also compromised when bribery is involved. This finding needs to be publicised so that the negative immediate effect of corruption is known. It may then dissuade the public from indulgence in corruption.

The survey indicates that most Rwandans are ready to take positive actions should they meet bribe demands in the future, however to date less than half of them have reported corruption cases to the appropriate anti-corruption mechanisms. A key hindrance to reporting is harassment and intimidation by officers in authorities who are in positions to receive corruption complaints cases. It is therefore necessary to make sure that such services perform their tasks in a professional yet friendly way and in addition establish other confidential means of reporting corruption in order to inspire public confidence and encourage citizens to report malpractices.

Finally, this study suggests that most Rwandans commend the efforts that the Government is making in the fight against corruption but at the same time acknowledge that more needs to be done. An area which probably requires more attention is grand corruption, which is more difficult to be captured by a survey such as this one, as demonstrated by the small size of most bribes mentioned by the respondents, and yet exists according to a number of citizens.

The fight against corruption requires an integrated effort by Government, private sector and civil society. The results of this study provide an important baseline from which the institutions can design interventions targeted at the various segments of Rwandan population with the objective of minimising corruption and making people aware of their rights and responsibilities with respect to corruption. From the study, it is evident that education will form the core pillar of intervention in the fight against corruption in Rwanda. While punitive measures against perpetrators of corruption must be put in place to curb incidences of corruption in the short term, the long term interventions must be anchored on education and awareness of the public. This survey provides a good start point for that.

Summary of key recommendations:

- Public institutions as well as the private sector should strengthen their governance structures: they should all adopt and implement codes of conduct, improve transparency and put in place effective anti-corruption mechanisms. The focus should be primarily on those institutions where corruption has been found to be most rampant e.g. the Police, conciliators, local government bodies and private sector.

- Civil society organisations should on the one hand put in place similar initiatives to curb corruption practices that affect their activities and structures; on the other hand, they should step up their advocacy efforts with public sector institutions to improve laws and policies as well as enhance transparency in service delivery.

- The government and CSOs should continue sensitising and raising awareness among citizens on the negative short- and long-term effects of corruption. They should also encourage victims of corruption to resist demands for bribe and report them to the relevant authorities.

- The institutions designed to receive complaints should increase their accessibility, including by improving their professionalism, confidentiality and friendliness. They should also continue enforcing punitive measures when appropriate, in order to further reduce impunity.

- Service delivery at local level deserves specific attention, as it is where bribes are more likely to be demanded and paid. Both public institutions and CSOs ought to closely monitor the quality and transparency of service delivery at decentralised levels.

- All actors should invest in education promoting values of integrity, honesty and good governance. There ought to be concerted efforts by private sector, civil society and the Government to advocate for integrity among the general public through periodic and sustained campaigns.

- More in general, a wide range of actors, including the private sector and civil society, should engage in the fight against corruption, each within the scope of its role. Public-private partnerships ought to be encouraged in working towards fighting corruption.

- The findings of this study suggest further research is needed on a number of issues including corruption affecting Rwandan civil society, extent of grand corruption in the country and how to encourage citizens to report corruption cases.