# The East African Bribery Index 2012

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# Executive summary

The East African Bribery Index 2012 sampled 9,303 respondents at the household level across the five East African countries of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The survey was coordinated and housed by Transparency International chapters in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. In Burundi, it was coordinated by Association Burundaise Des Consommateurs (ABUCO), a Transparency International national chapter in formation and Tanzania Transparency Forum (TRAFO) supporting the same in Tanzania.

The survey methodology substantially changed in 2012. Bribery experiences were recorded on the basis of public service sectors instead of individual institutions. The change was necessitated by the need for the partners to direct their policy advocacy interventions on sectoral perspectives. Arising from this change, the survey does not list individual institutions but the sectors as studied. This change spared the police and the judiciary given their consistent high ranking in the past. One of the key implications of the change of methodology was that Rwanda indicators were formulated in the index for the first time.

According to the aggregate index, Uganda registered the highest bribery levels in the region with a percentage value of 40.7%. Burundi, the worst ranked country last year recorded a significantly lower index of 18.8%. National index for Kenya and Tanzania were 29.5% and 39.1% respectively. Rwanda remained the least bribery-prone country in the region with an aggregate index of 2.5%.

The survey recorded bribery experiences in key sectors of medical services, education, water utilities, judiciary, police and registry and licences, tax services and the local Government. At the regional level, the likelihood of encountering bribery in the police, judiciary and in educational sector was highest in Tanzania at 64.4%, 53.7% and 28.2% respectively. In the medical sector, bribery likelihood was highest in Uganda. In terms of bribery initiation, Burundi leads in situations where the offer to pay was made by the respondents at 14%. Bribery demands were highest in Uganda at 40.7%.

At a perception level, Rwanda sustained the most positive outlook with only 1.9% of the respondents perceiving their country as being extremely corrupt. This compared starkly

with the perceptions in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya where the same was ranked at 51.3%, 47.5% and 41.4% respectively. Rwanda also registered the best future outlook with 80.1% observing that corruption levels will decrease in the next one year. Ugandan respondents had the worst future outlook with 50.4% observing that corruption levels will rise in the coming one year.

# Introduction

The East African region hosts some of the fastest growing economies in Africa, [1]with Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda leading the pack in that order. For this growth to impact on the ordinary citizen, governments need to invest heavily in the provision of basic services. This is already happening with countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, having achieved the goal of allocating a fifth of their national budget to the education sector. Bribery in the key sectors such as health, water and education can only compromise the commitment to make the growth sustainable and equitable.

Countries in the region are also being ushered into hitherto unimaginable possibilities of mining. Kenya and Uganda have discovered commercially viable deposits of oil while Tanzania has struck natural gas. Prospecting for oil both on land and offshore is at its peak with indication that more discoveries could be made. These discoveries are likely to boost the GDP levels in the region significantly. Going by the annual projections of US Dollars 30 billion for Mozambique[2], the economies will register windfalls likely to accelerate their drive to middle income status. For this to happen there is need to strengthen institutions through reforms to provide for transparency, accountability and participation. Lack of these three elements in governance has been partially blamed for upheavals that followed such discoveries elsewhere on the continent. Containing integrity concerns in such key practices like exploration block allocation, infrastructure development and revenue sharing will be imperative.

The positive economic prospects in the East African region have also attracted the attention of major global investors. Several companies have established regional offices to coordinate investment activities. Nairobi has particularly played host to Standard Chartered Bank, Coca Cola, IBM, Microsoft and Google regional offices[3]. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been identified as a global accelerator to economic growth. However, FDI is very sensitive to local governance practices. The high ranking of the judiciary and the police in the bribery index across the region should motivate necessary governance reforms if the momentum of FDI is to be sustained. The companies setting up in the region would also require some basic

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1  http://allafrica.com/stories/201112190148.html
2  http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/africa/2012/05/21/341731/p2/Two-East.htm
3  http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2012/02/britak-asset-managers-predict-5-3pc-growth/

utility and infrastructural provision. Bribery in key sectors therefore needs to be put in focus in order to mitigate the negative impact of corruption on development projects.

The region has focused on trade promotion through regional integration. This has gained momentum with the coming to effect of the East African Common Market Protocol in July 2010. However bribery has been identified as one of the non tariff barriers to intra-regional trade. The findings of the survey serve to further assert the need to confront this situation. The police play a vital role in the flow of trade along the transport corridors, at the weighbridges and at the transit points. It therefore follows that bribery will gravely add to the cost of doing business as it slows down the integration process. The cost of corruption and inefficiency in trade is borne ultimately by the consumer. On the intra regional trade, capital flows have risen. Kenya is now the largest single country trading partner for Rwanda and only comes second to the European Union[4]. Kenya is also the largest trading partner for Uganda[5]. The region can reap even more benefits of integration if inefficiencies to trade such as corruption are tackled.

Transparency International chapters in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda and the partners-TRAFO and ABUCO believe that the findings of the survey will inform the debate towards improved service delivery in the region. The policy makers ought to interrogate the current governance interventions with a view to strengthening them and to respond to the gaps that allow bribery practices to persist in service delivery.

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4  http://acetforafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Looking-East-Rwanda-China-case-study-2010.pdf
5  http://www.trademarksa.org/news/kenya-reaps-lion-s-share-eac-economic-integration

# Methodology

The East Africa Bribery Index 2012 survey was conducted at the household level across the five East African countries; Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The survey recorded responses on bribery from 9,303 respondents across the five countries, picked through simple random sampling based on population proposition to size across various administrative regions. Field data collection across the five countries was conducted between March and May of 2012. The respective national sample compositions were as follows:

**Sample size composition**

| Country | Sample size |
|---------|-------------|
| Burundi | 1,319 |
| Kenya | 2,017 |
| Rwanda | 2,382 |
| Tanzania | 2,136 |
| Uganda | 1,449 |
| **Total** | **9,303** |

*Table 1:  Sample distribution across the countries*

**Sample characteristics**

A majority of the respondents that participated in the survey were aged between 30-49 years and were residing in the rural areas. The gender representation was slightly tipped in favour of male respondents.

| Gender (%) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Burundi** | **Kenya** | **Rwanda** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
| **Male** | 55 | 56 | 60 | 56 | 54 |
| **Female** | 45 | 44 | 40 | 44 | 46 |

| Residency (%) | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | **Burundi** | **Kenya** | **Rwanda** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
| **Urban** | 12 | 37 | 13 | 28 | 20 |
| **Rural** | 88 | 63 | 87 | 72 | 80 |
| Age group (%) | | | | | |
| **18-29** | 23 | 46 | 41 | 24 | 39 |
| **30-49** | 66 | 43 | 45 | 63 | 49 |
| **50+** | 11 | 11 | 14 | 13 | 12 |

*Table 2:  Sample distribution by gender, residency and age – Across East Africa*

A majority of the respondents reported a primary school education followed closely by those who reported a secondary school education. Uganda and Tanzania had the smallest number of respondents reporting informal or no education.

| Highest Level of education (%) | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | **Burundi** | **Kenya** | **Rwanda** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
| Primary only | 24 | 15 | **58** | **31** | 16 |
| Post primary training | 12 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 7 |
| Secondary only | 10 | **33** | 11 | 29 | **30** |
| College education | **25** | 30 | 1 | 18 | 24 |
| Universitydegree | 13 | 12 | 1 | 8 | 18 |
| Post graduate degree | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Informal education | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| No education | 12 | 2 | 17 | 2 | 2 |

*Table 3:  Sample distribution by highest level of education – Across East Africa*

A majority of those sampled were self-employed, with exception of Rwanda where a majority of respondents were employed in a family business or farm. Those that were retired represented less than 5% of those sampled.

| Employment Status (%) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Burundi** | **Kenya** | **Rwanda** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
| Student | 6 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 10 |
| Unemployed | 10 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 9 |
| Self Employed | **46** | **43** | 23 | **40** | **36** |
| Employed in family business or farm | 5 | 9 | 58 | 15 | 12 |
| Employed in private sector | 7 | 16 | 7 | 15 | 14 |
| Employed by government/ Local authority/Parastatal | 19 | 8 | 1 | 12 | 11 |
| Employed in community Sector e.g. church, N.G.O, co-operative | 4 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 6 |
| Retired | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 |

*Table 4: Sample distribution by employment status – Across East Africa*

The bulk of the sample was picked from lower and middle income group. The profile of the respondents according to the income level, therefore, generally captures citizenry likely to depend on public provision of basic services.

| Household Income Levels (%) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Ksh)[6] | **Burundi** | **Kenya** | **Rwanda** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
| Less than 10,000 | 77 | 40 | 28 | 30 | 50 |
| 10,001-40,000 | 20 | 46 | 50 | 53 | 39 |
| 41,001-150,000 | 2 | 13 | 20 | 16 | 9 |
| More than 150,000 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 |

*Table 5: Sample distribution by household income levels – Across East Africa*

The survey's main objective was to trace bribery experiences by respondents across the five East African countries while seeking for services in the preceding 12 months. This was achieved by considering the following specifics found by asking the questions below:

　i.　Which institutions the respondent interacted with in the preceding 12 months while seeking services.

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6 At the time of the survey, the Kenya shilling exchanged at 16 with the Burundi Franc, 7 with the Rwanda Franc, 18 with the Tanzania shilling and 27 with the Uganda shilling.

ii.    Whether a bribe was expressly demanded, expected or offered during the interaction.

iii.    Where a bribe was expected/demanded, whether the respondent paid the bribe.

iv.    The number of times the respondent paid the bribe in each institution

v.    Whether the services sought were delivered either upon paying or refusing to pay the bribe.

The survey results were analysed along five study indicators: likelihood, prevalence, and perceived impact of bribery, share of national bribe and average size of bribe. The indicators were then weighed and aggregated to produce the overall aggregate figures for each of the institutions. The individual indicators were derived as follows:

**Indicator 1: Likelihood of encountering a bribery situation**

This is the proportion of individuals who interacted with institution X and a bribe was demanded/expected or offered within the last 12 months.

**Likelihood = Total number of bribe demand situations for institution X**

**Total number of interactions recorded for institution X**

**Indicator 2: Prevalence of bribery**

This is the proportion of those who interacted with institution X and paid a bribe within the last 12 months. That is, the total number of times bribes were paid as compared to the actual number of interactions at institution X.

**Prevalence = Total number of times bribes were recorded for institution X**

**Total number of interactions recorded for institution X**

**Indicator 3: Impact of bribery**

This is the proportion of those who interacted with institution X and thought that if they didn't pay a bribe then they were not to be served within the last 12 months

**Impact = Total number who thought they would not get service without a bribe to institution X**

**Total number of interactions recorded for institution X**

**Indicator 4: Share of 'national' bribe**

This is the share of the total amount of bribes paid in institution X out of the sum total amount paid in all sampled institutions within the last 12 months.

**Share =**     **Total amount of bribes paid in institution X**
_____

       **Total amount of bribes paid in all institutions**

## Indicator 5: Average size of bribe

This is the average bribe size per every bribe payer who interacted with institution X within the last 12 months.

**Average size =**     **Total amount of bribes paid in institution X**
_____

       **Individuals who paid a bribe in institution X**

## Change of methodology and the implications

The survey methodology for 2012 was changed to fit into reform imperatives in the region. Bribery experiences were sought and recorded based on different service sectors. The implication was that more interactions were recorded as compared to institution based survey. The same research tool was used across the region with slight variations on the sectors to reflect local realities. Service sectors in Rwanda, a country that has not been ranked in the previously surveys was ranked due to this change.

The Rwanda section of the survey was conducted under the auspices of the Rwanda Bribery Index. However, the sample size for Rwanda was relatively higher and was adopted wholly as used in that survey.

# The East African Bribery Index

Going by the overall likelihood of bribery across the region, Uganda takes the lead position with values of 40.7%. Tanzania comes second to Uganda at 39.1%. According to the survey, the likelihood of encountering bribery remained lowest in Rwanda.

**Comparison by likelihood**

| Rank | Country | Bribery Aggregate (%) |
|------|---------|----------------------|
| 1 | Uganda | 40.7 |
| 2 | Tanzania | 39.1 |
| 3 | Kenya | 29.5 |
| 4 | Burundi | 18.8 |
| 5 | Rwanda | 2.5 |

*Table 6: Comparison of the countries by aggregate likelihood of bribery demand*

**Comparisons in Key sectors across the East African region**

The survey compared bribery tendencies across key public sectors including medical services, education, water, judiciary, the police and civil registration across the East African Region with respect to likelihood and share of bribe indicators.

The civil registration and the medical sectors registered the worst performance in Uganda. Regionally, Tanzania hosted the worst performance of all the other ranked sectors of education, police, judiciary and water utilities. All the sectors reported consistently lower bribery in Rwanda.

| Sector | Country | | | | |
|--------|---------|------|--------|----------|--------|
| | **Burundi** | **Kenya** | **Rwanda** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
| Civil registration | 11.4 | 45.1 | 2.4 | 33.0 | 48.4 |
| Educational institutions | 15.5 | 13.8 | 1.4 | 28.2 | 26.7 |
| Judiciary | **40.6** | 35.1 | 4.8 | 53.7 | 49.6 |
| Medical | 3.2 | 34.3 | 0.8 | 42.1 | 42.7 |
| Police | 40.0 | **60.4** | **8.0** | **64.4** | **61.4** |
| Water utilities | 4.9 | 9.4 | 0.0 | 25.2 | 24.2 |

*Table 7: Likelihood of bribery in key sectors across East Africa*

With the exception of Burundi, the police reported the largest proportion of bribes across the region from a sectoral perspective. This position was claimed by the judiciary in Burundi. The objectives of the survey did not provide for mechanisms to establish reasons for the performance of particular institutions. However, it can be hypothesised that the police face some unique predispositions to bribery. Such may include the almost absolute monopoly for legitimate state violence and the powers to conduct arrests. The itinerant nature of their operations implies that a citizen does not need to seek out for their services to interact with the police. The slow and unpredictable nature of judicial processes is also likely to compel citizens to bribe the police to avoid lengthy court process.

The water sector recorded the lowest bribery levels across the region. This however may be a reflection of the limited state run water provision services relative to the other services covered.

| Sector | Country (%) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Burundi** | **Kenya** | **Rwanda** | **Tanzania** | **Uganda** |
| Civil registration | 8.5 | 6.7 | 16.8 | 3.0 | 3.4 |
| Educational institutions | 20.9 | 7.0 | 7.8 | 15.5 | 13.0 |
| Judiciary | **24.9** | 11.1 | 0.1 | 17.5 | 21.6 |
| Medical | 5.1 | 5.1 | 2.0 | 9.9 | 13.3 |
| Police | 22.5 | **28.8** | **36.0** | **27.3** | **30.5** |
| Water utilities | 0.8 | 1.6 | 0.0 | **2.5** | 1.6 |

*Table 8:  Share of bribe in key sectors across East Africa*

The survey sought to establish the initiation of bribe payments made to different sectors. In particular, the respondents were asked to state whether a bribe was demanded or they volunteered to pay. In all instances across the region, there were more cases of bribe demands than respondents' offers.

Burundi registered the closest relationship between these two bribery components with only a 4% spread between the bribery demands and offers at 18% and 14% respectively.  Kenya registered the lowest relative bribery offers.

The largest proportion of bribe demands or expectations was in Uganda (40.7%) while Burundians offered more to bribe (14.0%) than any other country in the region.

While it is difficult to infer with certainity the reasons for offering bribes, it may most likely be an indication of the respondent's perception on the culpability of the public officers in a certain country. On a different perspective, high demand rates may be an indication of public officers' level of entitlement on bribes and impunity thereof.

| Country | Demanded/expected (%) | Offered (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Uganda | **40.7** | 8.8 |
| Tanzania | 39.1 | 11.1 |
| Kenya | 29.5 | 4.8 |
| Burundi | 18.8 | **14.0** |
| Rwanda | 2.5 | 0.5 |

*Table 9: The nature of bribe situations*

## Aggregate Index

The indicators: Likelihood, prevalence, impact of bribery, share of bribe and the average amount were combined into one indicator. This indicator is scaled from 0 to 100 (with 100 being the worst score) and it depends on how the five indicators score a particular sector. This is because some of the sectors may have had a low likelihood, but the impact or the average amount of bribe paid is of considerable magnitude. If a particular sector scores the highest by all the five indicators then it will return a value of 100.

The police, judiciary and the land services occupy the top ten most bribery prone sectors in the region. The police performance is particularly adverse with all the police institutions being ranked in this top worst league. The adverse ranking of the police and judiciary particularly paints a grim picture of the state of affairs in the law enforcement services in the region.

| Rank | Sector | Country | Aggregate Index |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Police | Uganda | 85.0 |
| 2 | Police | Tanzania | 82.9 |
| 3 | Police | Kenya | 71.7 |
| 4 | Land services | Kenya | 70.0 |
| 5 | Judiciary | Burundi | 63.3 |
| 6 | Police | Burundi | 63.3 |
| 7 | Judiciary | Tanzania | 45.0 |
| 8 | Judiciary | Uganda | 44.0 |
| 9 | Police | Rwanda | 37.5 |
| 10 | Land services | Burundi | 35.8 |
| 11 | Tax services | Burundi | 35.7 |
| 12 | City and local councils | Tanzania | 33.9 |
| 13 | Tax services | Uganda | 32.5 |
| 14 | Judiciary | Kenya | 29.7 |
| 15 | Registry and licensing services | Kenya | 28.9 |
| 16 | Land services | Uganda | 26.9 |
| 17 | Registry and licensing services | Uganda | 23.2 |

| Rank | Sector | Country | Aggregate Index |
|------|--------|---------|-----------------|
| 18 | Educational institutions | Burundi | 22.5 |
| 19 | City and local councils | Uganda | 21.8 |
| 20 | Medical services | Uganda | 20.7 |
| 21 | Land services | Tanzania | 20.4 |
| 22 | Medical services | Tanzania | 20.2 |
| 23 | Regional administration | Tanzania | 19.3 |
| 24 | City and local councils | Kenya | 18.9 |
| 25 | Provincial administration | Burundi | 18.2 |
| 26 | Registry and licensing services | Burundi | 18.0 |
| 27 | Bank | Rwanda | 16.7 |
| 28 | Educational institutions | Uganda | 16.5 |
| 29 | Provincial administration | Rwanda | 16.4 |
| 30 | Educational institutions | Tanzania | 16.2 |
| 31 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | Kenya | 16.1 |
| 32 | City and local councils | Rwanda | 15.8 |
| 33 | Registry and licensing services | Tanzania | 15.7 |
| 34 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | Tanzania | 14.6 |
| 35 | Tax services | Kenya | 14.2 |
| 36 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | Burundi | 13.7 |
| 37 | Educational institutions | Kenya | 12.7 |
| 38 | Medical services | Kenya | 12.6 |
| 39 | Private Sector | Rwanda | 12.5 |
| 40 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | Uganda | 12.4 |
| 41 | Medical services | Burundi | 12.2 |
| 42 | Provincial administration | Kenya | 12.2 |
| 43 | Registry and licensing services | Rwanda | 12.1 |
| 44 | Land services | Rwanda | 11.5 |
| 45 | Tax services | Tanzania | 11.4 |
| 46 | Educational institutions | Rwanda | 8.7 |
| 47 | Tax services | Rwanda | 7.4 |
| 48 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | Rwanda | 5.5 |
| 49 | Medical services | Rwanda | 5.5 |
| 50 | Judiciary | Rwanda | 5.5 |
| 51 | Civil Society | Rwanda | 4.0 |

*Table 10:  Aggregate Index for the five countries*

# Burundi

## Sample characterisation

The survey was conducted at the household level among a sample population of 1,319 respondents randomly picked across Burundi's provinces as follows:

| Province | Actual count | % |
|---|---|---|
| Bubanza | 59 | 4.5 |
| Bujumbura | 93 | 7.1 |
| Bujumbura-Marie | 98 | 7.4 |
| Bururi | 106 | 8.0 |
| Cankuzo | 30 | 2.3 |
| Cibitoke | 86 | 6.5 |
| Gitega | 136 | 10.3 |
| Karuzi | 80 | 6.1 |
| Kayanza | 100 | 7.6 |
| Kirundo | 61 | 4.6 |
| Makamba | 79 | 6.0 |
| Muramvya | 54 | 4.1 |
| Muyinga | 113 | 8.6 |
| Mwaro | 50 | 3.8 |
| Ngozi | 109 | 8.3 |
| Rutana | 65 | 4.9 |
| **Total** | **1319** | **100.0** |

*Table 11:  Sample characterisation – Burundi*

## Findings

### Aggregate index

The aggregate index is a composite index resulting from the combination of the five different indicators of the survey. It serves to capture an overall reflection of the bribery pattern in an institution.

The judiciary and police tie as the most bribery prone institutions in Burundi. Among the ranked sectors, medical services had the lowest aggregate figure, a situation reflected in most of the other individual indicators.

| Rank | Sector | Aggregate Index |
|------|--------|-----------------|
| 1 | Judiciary | 63.3 |
| 2 | Police | 63.3 |
| 3 | Land services | 35.8 |
| 4 | Tax services | 35.7 |
| 5 | Educational institutions | 22.5 |
| 6 | Provincial administration | 18.2 |
| 7 | Registry and licensing services | 18.0 |
| 8 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 13.7 |
| 9 | Medical services | 12.2 |

*Table 12: Aggregate Index – Burundi*

## Indicator ranking

### Likelihood

The survey defined likelihood as the probability of a respondent being asked for or expected to pay a bribe when interacting with a particular sector in the preceding 12 months. Statistically, the indicator was derived as a number of all bribe demand situations registered in a sector as a proportion of all the interactions registered in that particular sector. The indicator was ranked from 0 to 100 with the latter being the most adverse.

Respondents interacting with the judiciary and the police were faced with the highest chance that a bribe would be either openly asked or expected from them. This level of likelihood was almost as twice as high compared to the next set of institutions. A respondent was least likely to be in a bribery demand situation when seeking for medical services.

| Rank | Sector | Likelihood (%) |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1 | Judiciary | 40.6 |
| 2 | Police | 40.0 |
| 3 | Land services | 23.9 |
| 4 | Provincial administration | 23.7 |
| 5 | Educational institutions | 15.5 |
| 6 | Registry and licensing services | 11.6 |
| 7 | Tax services | 10.4 |
| 8 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 6.6 |
| 9 | Medical services | 3.2 |

*Table 13: Likelihood of bribery – Burundi*

## Prevalence

Prevalence as an indicator measured the probability that a bribe would be paid to a sector upon interaction by respondents. The indicator was derived as the number of bribes recorded in a particular sector as a proportion of total number of interactions registered in that sector. Higher values indicated the seriousness of unofficial levies in a sector.

Police was worst performer on this scale with almost 60% of all respondents having had to pay a bribe each time they interacted with the institution.

| Rank | Sector | Prevalence (%) |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1 | Police | 55.9 |
| 2 | Judiciary | 37.8 |
| 3 | Land services | 27.5 |
| 4 | Tax services | 16.2 |
| 5 | Registry and licensing services | 14.5 |
| 6 | Provincial administration | 13.0 |
| 7 | Educational institutions | 11.4 |
| 8 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 2.7 |
| 9 | Medical services | 1.5 |

*Table 14:  Prevalence of bribery – Burundi*

## Perceived Impact

This indicator captured respondents perception on whether they would have received the services they sought from a particular institution if they failed to pay a bribe. Perceived impact as an indicator was only derived from among those respondents who reported having paid a bribe and received a service. It sought to bring out the value that the bribe payers had attached on the bribes paid as the only way to get the service.

The indicator is a serious indictment on how citizens view bribery as the power to influence access to services. In Burundi, a quarter of the respondents who paid bribes and got services from the police believed that they would not have otherwise been served if they failed to pay the bribes.

| Rank | Sector | Perceived impact (%) |
|------|--------|----------------------|
| 1 | Police | 25.0 |
| 2 | Land services | 19.4 |
| 3 | Judiciary | 18.4 |
| 4 | Tax services | 17.9 |
| 5 | Educational institutions | 10.3 |
| 6 | Provincial administration | 9.8 |
| 7 | Registry and licensing services | 7.8 |
| 8 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 3.7 |
| 9 | Medical services | 0.9 |

*Table 15:  Perceived impact of bribery – Burundi*

## Share of national bribe

This indicator reflects the proportion of bribes an institution accounts for relative to the total amount of bribes recorded by the survey in a particular country. It reflects the proportional culpability of an institution as measured by the amount of bribes received.

The judiciary, police and educational institutions accounted for almost seven in ten of all the bribes recorded in Burundi in money terms. It is notable that the education sector assumed the worst rank in this indicator relative to the other four indicators.

| Rank | Sector | Share of bribe (%) |
|------|--------|--------------------|
| 1 | Judiciary | 24.9 |
| 2 | Police | 22.5 |
| 3 | Educational institutions | 20.9 |
| 4 | Registry and licensing services | 9.5 |
| 5 | Provincial administration | 6.8 |
| 6 | Medical services | 5.1 |
| 7 | Tax services | 5.0 |
| 8 | Land services | 3.1 |
| 9 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 2.1 |

*Table 16:  Share of national bribe – Burundi*

## Average size of bribe

This indicator captured the average bribe size per respondent. It was derived as a measure of how much on average each bribe payer had to part with to a particular institution. It is the arithmetic mean of all bribes paid to an institution relative to all the respondents reporting having paid a bribe to that particular institution.

Tax services attracted the highest average bribe figure. It may be concluded the services for which respondents pay bribes in this sector are high value transactions like tax evasion. The implication therefore would be that a respondent would be willing to make a higher bribe payment.

| Rank | Sector | Average size of bribe(FBU) |
|------|--------|----------------------------|
| 1 | Tax services | 161,388.94 |
| 2 | Land services | 90,100.00 |
| 3 | Judiciary | 86,122.75 |
| 4 | Educational institutions | 68,339.55 |
| 5 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 58,761.90 |
| 6 | Police | 47,812.87 |
| 7 | Registry and licensing   services | 39,460.44 |
| 8 | Provincial administration | 33,943.97 |
| 9 | Medical services | 20,548.95 |

*Table 17:  Average size of bribe – Burundi*

## Reasons for paying bribes

The reasons why bribes were paid was sought with a majority holding the view that it was the only way to access services in Burundi followed a marginal proportion of the respondents reporting paying a bribe because they had to get the service at any cost.

| Reason | ( %) |
|---|---|
| It was the only way to access service | 58.1 |
| To get the service at any cost | 16.4 |
| To avoid problems with authorities | 10.4 |
| To access a service I did not legally deserve | 6.6 |
| To avoid paying full cost of service | 4.8 |
| Others | 3.7 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 18: Reasons for paying bribes – Burundi*

## Corruption reporting

The survey sought to establish the willingness of respondents to report incidents of bribery to authorities. Reporting was defined as making a complaint or providing information to a person from whom an authoritative response was expected.



*Figure 1: Proportions of those who complained/reported – Burundi*

A huge proportion of the respondents did not report the incidences to any authority or person and only a marginal proportion of 10.5% reported or complained. This was an improvement as only 3.2% reported in 2011.

## Reasons for not reporting

Out of those who never reported, about a quarter mentioned having not given the idea of reporting a thought. Almost an equal proportion feared intimidation from persons involved or those close to them. Strikingly, about a fifth failed to report based on their perception that no action would follow such reporting.

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| Did not occur to me that I should report | 25.6 |
| Fear of intimidation | 24.2 |
| I knew no action would be taken even if I reported | 20.8 |
| Fear of self-incrimination | 14.4 |
| Didn't know where to report | 12.7 |
| Others | 2.4 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 19: Reasons for not reporting – Burundi*

## Institutions where corruption was reported

Those who reported did so to the following institutions-



*Figure 2: Where cases were reported – Burundi*

Out of those who reported, a large number reported the bribery incidents encountered to the management of the various institutions with only a small proportion reporting to the anti-corruption authority.

## Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting the bribery incidence

Corruption reporting received an adverse assessment following an observation that only a marginal proportion perceived actions taken on those reports as being sufficient. In almost half of the cases, no action at all was taken. Almost a similar proportion of the reported cases elicited unsatisfactory responses to those who reported.

*Figure 3: Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting – Burundi*

## Corruption Perception

From a perceptual perspective, the survey sought to establish the respondents' views on the trends of corruption in their country. This information was captured based on perceived corruption levels, expected trends and the government efforts in combating the vice.

### Perceived current level of corruption

Describing the current state of corruption, majority of the respondents believed that Burundi was either corrupt or extremely corrupt.



*Figure 4: Perceived current level of corruption – Burundi*

## Respondents' view on the current state of corruption compared to one year ago - Burundi

Almost a quarter of the respondents observed that corruption in Burundi decreased in the last 12 months. However, there seems to be little real change on this aspect given an almost equivalent proportion that perceived the levels to have remained the same and about a half that observed that it remained the same.



*Figure 5: Respondents' view on the current state of corruption compared to one year ago – Burundi*

## Respondents' view on the incidences of corruption in the next one year

The perceived future outlook looks positive with about a third of the respondents expecting corruption levels to slide in the next one year. However, about two in every five respondents still fear that the severity of the vice may not change.



*Figure 6: Projected levels of corruption for the next one year – Burundi*

## Reason for projected increase in corruption

Majority of those who felt that corruption would increase in the future believed that lack of action against those implicated would play a part in increase of the vice. Other reasons cited include citizens' acceptance of corrupt way of doing things and poor remuneration of government officials.

| Reasons | (%) |
|---|---|
| No action is taken against the corrupt | 44 |
| Lack of government commitment to fight corruption | 28 |
| It's an accepted way of life – you have to pay a bribe to get a service | 18 |
| Poor remuneration of government officials | 10 |
| **Total** | **100** |

*Table 20:  Reason for projected increase in corruption – Burundi*

## Government's commitment to fight corruption

When asked whether they thought that the government was doing enough to fight corruption in Burundi, a majority of the respondents declined to answer the question. Only about a third of the respondents thought that government's efforts were not enough. This is a different view from last year where a majority of the respondents thought that the government was not doing enough to fight corruption.



*Figure 7: Government's commitment to fight corruption – Burundi*

## Reasons for assessment

About a third of the respondents who were sceptical on government commitment to tackle corruption based their perception on the failure to take action against known suspects. Further, the government itself was perceived to be corrupt by a fifth of the respondents.

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| Corrupt persons are always known but are not arrested and punished. | 31 |
| Lack of political will to fight corruption | 26 |
| The government officials themselves are corrupt | 20 |
| Corruption is an accepted  way of life | 13 |
| Other | 10 |
| **Total** | **100** |

*Table 21:  Reason for assessment – Burundi*

# Kenya

## Sample characterisation

In Kenya a sample of 2,017 was randomly picked at the household level across the eight administrative provinces as follows:

| Province | Actual count | (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Central | 237 | 11.8 |
| Coast | 188 | 9.3 |
| Eastern | 312 | 15.5 |
| Nairobi | 165 | 8.2 |
| North Eastern | 110 | 5.5 |
| Nyanza | 281 | 13.9 |
| Rift Valley | 505 | 25.0 |
| Western | 219 | 10.9 |
| **Total** | **2017** | **100.0** |

*Table 22:  Sample distribution – Kenya*

## Findings

### Aggregate index

The aggregate index is a composite index resulting from the combination of the five different indicators of the survey. It serves to capture an overall reflection of the bribery pattern in an institution.

The police and the land services sector performed remarkably worse than the rest of the sectors with more than 40 percentage points separating the two sets. It is notable that there have been efforts to reform these two institutions in the last few years. The survey results may be an indicator that such efforts have not reflected positively on the experiences of service seekers. This situation compares unfavourably with the judiciary which though in the third position ranks much lower in terms of severity.

| Rank | Sector | Aggregate Index |
|------|--------|-----------------|
| 1 | Police | 71.7 |
| 2 | Land services | 70.0 |
| 3 | Judiciary | 29.7 |
| 4 | Registry and licensing services | 28.9 |
| 5 | City and local councils | 18.9 |
| 6 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 16.1 |
| 7 | Tax services | 14.2 |
| 8 | Educational institutions | 12.7 |
| 9 | Medical services | 12.6 |
| 10 | Provincial administration | 12.2 |

*Table 23: Aggregate Index – Kenya*

## Indicator Ranking

**Likelihood**

The survey defined likelihood as the probability of a respondent being asked for or expected to pay a bribe when interacting with a particular sector in the preceding 12 months. Statistically, the indicator was derived as a number of all bribe demand situations registered in a sector as a proportion of all the interactions registered in that particular sector. The indicator ranged from 0 to 100 with the latter being the most adverse.

As can be noted, the top four institutions reported a more than 40% probability that a citizen interacting with either of them would be asked or expected to pay a bribe. This situation was most dire with the police where at least six in every ten respondents reported finding themselves in a bribery situation.

| Rank | Sector | Likelihood (%) |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1 | Police | 60.4 |
| 2 | Land services | 57.3 |
| 3 | City and local councils | 42.8 |
| 4 | Registry and licensing services | 41.5 |
| 5 | Judiciary | 35.1 |
| 6 | Medical services | 34.3 |
| 7 | Tax services | 30.3 |
| 8 | Provincial administration | 28.0 |
| 9 | Educational institutions | 13.8 |
| 10 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 8.8 |

*Table 24: Likelihood of bribery – Kenya*

## Prevalence

Prevalence as an indicator measured the probability that a bribe would be paid to an institution or sector upon interaction with respondents. The indicator was derived as the number of bribes recorded in a particular institution or sector as a proportion of the total number of interactions registered in that sector. Higher values indicated the seriousness of unofficial levies in a sector.

The land sector led in terms of the number of bribes actually paid by the respondents. When compared to likelihood, it can be observed that though it is more likely to be asked to pay a bribe by the police relative to land offices, the probability that the bribe is actually paid is higher in the latter. The implication might be that it is easier for the ordinary citizen to turn down the request from the police than from land officials.

| Rank | Sector | Prevalence (%) |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1 | Land services | 37.9 |
| 2 | Registry and licensing services | 28.6 |
| 3 | Police | 26.8 |
| 4 | Judiciary | 17.4 |
| 5 | Provincial administration | 13.4 |
| 6 | City and local councils | 12.5 |
| 7 | Medical services | 8.0 |
| 8 | Tax services | 6.8 |
| 9 | Educational institutions | 2.6 |
| 10 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 2.4 |

*Table 25: Prevalence of bribery – Kenya*

## Perceived Impact

This indicator captured respondents perception on whether they would have received the services they sought from a particular institution if they failed to pay a bribe. Perceived impact as an indicator was only derived from among those respondents who reported having paid a bribe and received a service. It sought to bring out the value that the bribe payers attached to the bribes paid as the only way to get the service.

It was reported that an average respondent was most likely not to get served by the police upon failure to pay a bribe. Only a marginal percentage believed they would have been denied services if they failed to pay bribes while interacting with utility institutions.

| Rank | Sector | Perceived impact (%) |
|------|--------|----------------------|
| 1 | Police | 42.7 |
| 2 | Land services | 34.0 |
| 3 | Judiciary | 23.5 |
| 4 | Registry and licensing services | 22.7 |
| 5 | City and local councils | 22.2 |
| 6 | Tax services | 15.4 |
| 7 | Provincial administration | 14.9 |
| 8 | Medical services | 10.2 |
| 9 | Educational institutions | 5.6 |
| 10 | Utilities | 4.7 |

*Table 26: Perceived impact of bribery – Kenya*

**Share of national bribe**

This indicator reflects the proportion of bribes an institution accounts for relative to the total amount of bribes recorded by the survey in a particular country. It reflects the proportional culpability of an institution as measured by the amount of bribes received.

Almost 60% of the total bribes in money terms reported in Kenya were paid to the police, land services, and the registration offices. The police accounted for almost a third of the total. The utilities performance on this indicator was notably worse as compared to the other indicators. It may imply that though bribery may not be very prevalent within the utilities sector, when it occurs, the amounts are substantial.

| Rank | Sector | Share of bribe (%) |
|------|--------|--------------------|
| 1 | Police | 28.8 |
| 2 | Land services | 16.6 |
| 3 | Registry and licensing services | 12.1 |
| 4 | Judiciary | 11.1 |
| 5 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 8.7 |
| 6 | Educational institutions | 7.0 |
| 7 | City and local councils | 5.7 |
| 8 | Medical services | 5.1 |
| 9 | Tax services | 2.5 |
| 10 | Provincial administration | 2.4 |

*Table 27: Share of national bribe – Kenya*

**Average size of bribe**

This indicator captured the average bribe size per respondent. It was derived as a measure of how much on average each bribe payer had to part with to a particular institution. It is the arithmetic mean all bribes paid to an institution relative to all the respondents reporting having paid a bribe to that particular institution.

The premium attached to services sought at the land offices is quite high as reflected by the amounts of bribes an average respondent is ready to part with. Judiciary comes second on this account. It can be observed that, though the police rank almost most adverse in other indicators, the institution ranks relatively better on this. This may be attributed to the likelihood that the police may have the tendency to extort frequent small bribes as opposed to few large ones. The police are also more likely to interact with poor sections of the population whose expected abilities to bribe is limited in amounts.

| Rank | Sector | Average size of bribe(Ksh) |
|------|--------|----------------------------|
| 1 | Land services | 9,842.45 |
| 2 | Judiciary | 5,063.50 |
| 3 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 3,696.33 |
| 4 | Police | 2,801.67 |
| 5 | Tax services | 2,787.50 |
| 6 | Educational institutions | 2,750.82 |
| 7 | City and local councils | 2,300.32 |
| 8 | Registry and licensing services | 1,288.21 |
| 9 | Medical services | 1,105.24 |
| 10 | Provincial administration | 810.54 |

*Table 28: Average size of bribe – Kenya*

**Reasons for paying bribes**

The most common reason why respondents in Kenya reported paying bribe was to hasten up services closely followed by those who think that it is the only way access services. There was only a small portion of respondents who reported being motivated to pay bribes to acquire services otherwise not legally deserved.

| Reasons for paying bribe | (%) |
|--------------------------|-----|
| To hasten up service | 38.3 |
| It was the only way to access service | 31.6 |
| To avoid problems with authorities | 20.0 |
| To avoid paying full cost of service | 7.1 |
| To access a service I did not legally deserve | 2.2 |
| Others | 0.9 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 29: Reasons for paying bribes – Kenya*

## Corruption reporting

A majority of the respondents who encountered bribery never complained or reported the incidences. There seemed to be deterioration in the proportion of those who reported in 2012 which stood at 5.5% compared to 7.1% in 2011 and 10.8% in 2010. Answers should be sought on what is causing this downward trend.



*Figure 8: Corruption reporting – Kenya*

### Reasons for not reporting

Most of those who never reported believed that no action would be taken. This is in line with more than half of the reported cases where no action was taken. A proportion of about a third of those who failed to report either did not know where to report or never gave it a thought. This is critical information to both state and non-state anti-corruption agencies on the amount of effort that still needs to be done on promoting corruption reporting.

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| I knew no action would be taken even if I reported | 36.1 |
| Didn't know where to report | 16.4 |
| Did not occur to me that I should report | 15.6 |
| Fear of Self incrimination | 14.3 |
| Fear of intimidation | 13.0 |
| Other | 4.6 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 30:  Reasons for not reporting – Kenya*

### Where corruption was reported

Among those who reported, the majority did so to the management of the respective institutions. Only 5.7% out of those who reported did so to anti-corruption authorities. Again this should be a critical perspective for state anti corruption institutions.

*Figure 9: Where the cases were reported – Kenya*

**Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting the bribery incidence**

As a further illumination as to low rates of reporting, more than half of the reports made went unresolved. Further, even on those that received action, the same was viewed as unsatisfactory.



*Figure 10: Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting – Kenya*

## Corruption Perception

The second strand of the survey involved the mapping out of perceptions of the respondents on key trends in the efforts against corruption in the country. The respondents were asked to make perceptual observations on the recent past, present and near future trends on corruption levels.

**Perceived current level of corruption**

The same trends of perceived corruption persist from 2011 with most respondents holding the view that the institutions in Kenya were either corrupt to a notable extent with 41.4% of them perceiving public service to be extremely corrupt. This is in line with about a third of

the respondents who perceived corruption levels as having increased and the trend is likely to increase as per 29.0% of the respondents in the coming year.



*Figure 11: Perceived current level of corruption – Kenya*

**Respondents' view on the current state of corruption compared to one year ago**

Asked to gauge how corruption levels changed in the last one year, there was an almost equal spread between those who thought the vice increased, remained the same and that it decreased. This further supports the assertion above that there seems to be no perceived change in the corruption levels in Kenya.



*Figure 12: Respondents' view on the current state of corruption compared to one year ago – Kenya*

## Projected levels of corruption for the next one year

The same trend as mentioned above was replicated on the perceived near future trends of the vice.



*Figure 13: Respondents' view on the incidences of corruption in the next one year – Kenya*

## Reasons for projected increase in corruption

Those who thought that corruption will increase cited various reasons for this perception, the most common one being the government's lack of commitment to fight the vice. Interestingly, the upcoming general elections were also mentioned as a reason for increased levels of corruption in Kenya. Advances that have been made in mobile telephony in the recent past got cited negatively as making corruption easier.

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| The government is not committed to fight corruption | 39 |
| Corruption is an accepted way of life | 20 |
| Upcoming elections | 15 |
| Low salaries paid to civil servants | 14 |
| New technology making corruption 'easier' | 12 |
| **Total** | **100** |

*Table 31:  Reasons for projected increase in corruption – Kenya*

## Government's commitment to fight corruption

The respondents were also asked to rate their government's effort in fighting corruption. Fifty per cent of the respondents thought that the government of Kenya was not doing enough to fight corruption. This is down from last year's evaluation where 61% of respondents thought that the government was not doing enough.

*Figure 14: Government's commitment to fight corruption – Kenya*

**Reasons for negative assessment**

Among the reasons they gave for this evaluation were that civil servants and other government officials were the chief perpetrators of corrupt practices and as such cannot be trusted to fight corruption, the cost of living has gone higher as a direct effect of corruption and a lack of political will to fight corruption.

| Reason | % |
|---|---|
| Corrupt government officials | 38 |
| Impunity | 35 |
| Lack of political will to fight corruption | 11 |
| Cost of living has gone up because of corruption | 8 |
| Other | 8 |
| **Total** | **100** |

*Table 32:  Reasons for negative assessment – Kenya*

# Rwanda

## Sample characterisation

A sample of 2382 respondents was picked randomly across the 5 provinces in Rwanda to participate in the survey. The distribution is indicated below.

| Province | Actual count | (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Eastern | 540 | 22.7 |
| Kigali City | 291 | 12.2 |
| Northern | 418 | 17.5 |
| Southern | 586 | 24.6 |
| Western | 547 | 23.0 |
| **Total** | **2382** | **100.0** |

*Table 33: Sample distribution – Rwanda*

## Findings

### Aggregate Index

The aggregate index is a composite index resulting from the combination of the five different indicators of the survey. It serves to capture an overall reflection of the bribery pattern in an institution.

The police in Rwanda was ranked overall as the worst performing institution followed closely by the banks and provincial administration. While the Police in Rwanda are seen to be the worst performing in their country, their East African counterparts all performed worse. The judiciary was among the best performing institutions in Rwanda a feat not accomplished elsewhere in the East Africa region.

| Rank | Sector | Aggregate Index |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Police | 37.5 |
| 2 | Bank | 16.7 |
| 3 | Provincial administration | 16.4 |
| 4 | City and local councils | 15.8 |
| 5 | Private Sector | 12.5 |
| 6 | Registry and licensing services | 12.1 |
| 7 | Land services | 11.5 |
| 8 | Educational institutions | 8.7 |
| 9 | Tax services | 7.4 |
| 10 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 5.5 |
| 11 | Medical services | 5.5 |
| 12 | Judiciary | 5.5 |
| 13 | Civil Society | 4.0 |

*Table 34:  Aggregate Index – Rwanda*

## Indicator Ranking

### Likelihood

The survey defined likelihood as the probability of a respondent being asked for or expected to pay a bribe when interacting with a particular sector in the preceding 12 months. Statistically, the indicator was derived as a number of all bribe demand situations registered in a sector a proportion of all the interactions registered in that particular sector. The indicator was ranged from 0 to 100 with the latter being the most adverse.

The provincial administration led in this category, with an 18% chance of a bribe being demanded or expected while seeking a service. That probability reduces to between 5% and 8% while seeking a service from the police, the city and local councils and the judiciary and less than 3% while seeking registry, tax and land services.

| Rank | Sector | Likelihood (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Provincial administration | 18.5 |
| 2 | Police | 8.0 |
| 3 | Private Sector | 7.1 |
| 4 | City and local councils | 6.6 |
| 5 | Judiciary | 4.8 |
| 6 | Registry and licensing services | 2.5 |
| 7 | Land services | 1.8 |
| 8 | Tax services | 1.7 |
| 9 | Bank | 1.7 |
| 10 | Educational institutions | 1.4 |
| 11 | Medical services | 0.8 |
| 12 | Utilities | 0.0 |
| 13 | Civil Society | 0.0 |

*Table 35:  Likelihood of bribe – Rwanda*

Prevalence as an indicator measured the probability that a bribe would be paid to a sector upon interaction by respondents. The indicator was derived as the number of bribes recorded in a particular sector as a proportion of total number of interactions registered in that sector. Higher values indicated the seriousness of unofficial levies in a sector. While the likelihood of a bribe demand or expectation was highest at the provincial administration, the probability making an actual payment of a bribe was at 1.6%. Once again the police scored badly in this category within the country but was way ahead of its East African counterparts.

| Rank | Sector | Prevalence (%) |
|:---:|:---|:---:|
| 1 | Police | 5.5 |
| 2 | City and local councils | 2.9 |
| 3 | Private Sector | 1.7 |
| 4 | Provincial administration | 1.6 |
| 5 | Registry and licensing services | 0.8 |
| 6 | Land services | 0.7 |
| 7 | Tax services | 0.5 |
| 8 | Educational institutions | 0.4 |
| 9 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 0.3 |
| 10 | Bank | 0.3 |
| 11 | Medical services | 0.1 |
| 12 | Judiciary | 0.1 |
|  | Civil Society | 0.0 |

*Table 36: Prevalence of bribe – Rwanda*

**Perceived Impact**

This indicator captured respondents perception on whether they would have received the services they sought from a particular institution if they failed to pay a bribe. Perceived impact as an indicator was only derived from among those respondents who reported having paid a bribe and received a service. It sought to bring out the value that the bribe payers had on the bribes paid as the only way to get the service.

Most notably, less than 5% of the respondents visiting these institutions believed that they had to pay a bribe to get a service. This reflects positively for these Rwandan institutions as a majority of the population can comfortably access services without being asked to pay a bribe.

| Rank | Sector | Perceived impact (%) |
|------|--------|---------------------|
| 1 | Police | 4.6 |
| 2 | City and local councils | 2.8 |
| 3 | Private Sector | 2.4 |
| 4 | Tax services | 1.7 |
| 5 | Provincial administration | 1.5 |
| 6 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 0.9 |
| 7 | Registry and licensing services | 0.9 |
| 8 | Bank | 0.6 |
| 9 | Educational institutions | 0.6 |
| 10 | Judiciary | 0.6 |
| 11 | Land services | 0.6 |
| 12 | Medical services | 0.0 |
|  | Civil Society | 0.0 |

*Table 37: Perceived impact of bribery – Rwanda*

## Share of national bribe

This indicator reflects the proportion of bribes an institution accounts for relative to the total amount of bribes recorded by the survey in a particular country. It reflects the proportional culpability of an institution as measured by the amount of bribes received.

About 36% of all the total bribes paid in Rwanda were paid to the police alone, with almost half of the total being paid to registry, bank and land services. It is worth noting that while the likelihood of being asked to pay a bribe was highest at the provincial administration, the actual bribes paid were less than 1% of the national share.

| Rank | Sector | Share of bribe (%) |
|------|--------|--------------------|
| 1 | Police | 36.0 |
| 2 | Registry and licensing services | 18.5 |
| 3 | Bank | 16.0 |
| 4 | Land services | 11.5 |
| 5 | Educational institutions | 7.8 |
| 6 | City and local councils | 6.5 |
| 7 | Medical services | 2.1 |
| 8 | Private Sector | 0.5 |
| 9 | Tax services | 0.4 |
| 10 | Provincial administration | 0.3 |
| 11 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 0.2 |
| 12 | Judiciary | 0.1 |
| 13 | Civil Society | 0.0 |

*Table 38: Share of National bribe – Rwanda*

**Average size of bribe**

This indicator captured the average bribe size per respondent. It was derived as a measure of how much on average each bribe payer had to part with to a particular institution. It is the arithmetic mean all bribes paid to an institution relative to all the respondents reporting having paid a bribe to that particular institution.

Banks, land services and educational institutions and the police in that order, were the recipients of the largest size of bribes despite the fact that they ranked well in other indicators. This means that their services are highly valued judging by the amounts the respondents were willing to pay.

| Rank | Sector | Average size of bribe(RWF) |
|------|--------|----------------------------|
| 1 | Bank | 42,933.33 |
| 2 | Land services | 37,000.00 |
| 3 | Educational institutions | 25,200.00 |
| 4 | Police | 21,481.48 |
| 5 | Registry and licensing services | 18,643.75 |
| 6 | City and local councils | 10,500.10 |
| 7 | Medical services | 8,500.00 |
| 8 | Private Sector | 8,000.00 |
| 9 | Tax services | 3,500.00 |
| 10 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 3,000.00 |
| 11 | Provincial administration | 2,500.00 |
| 12 | Judiciary | 2,000.00 |
| 13 | Civil Society | 0.00 |

*Table 39: Average size of bribe – Rwanda*

**Reasons why bribes were paid**

The most common reason why people were paying bribes was to hasten up services at this was followed by those who thought that it was the only way to access service and those who wished to avoid problems with authorities respectively.

| Reason | (%) |
|--------|-----|
| To hasten up service | 37.5 |
| It was the only way to access service | 22.5 |
| To avoid problems with authorities | 20.0 |
| To avoid paying full cost of service | 7.5 |
| Others | 7.5 |
| To access a service I did not legally deserve | 5.0 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 40: Reasons why bribes are paid – Rwanda*

*Figure 15: Corruption reporting*

As was the case in 2011, an overwhelming majority of the respondents who encountered bribery while seeking services chose not to report the incidences. A majority of these believed that no action would be taken after reporting, followed by those who did not know where to report and those to whom it did not occur to report. Significantly, those who recorded fear of intimidation as a reason for not reporting dropped from 30% in 2011 to 11.2% this year.

**Reasons why they never reported**

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| I knew no action would be taken even if I reported | 28.8 |
| Did not occur to me that I should report | 16.8 |
| Didn't know where to report | 16.0 |
| Fear of self-incrimination | 15.2 |
| Other | 12.0 |
| Fear of intimidation | 11.2 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 41: Reasons for not reporting – Rwanda*

**Where the cases were reported**



*Figure 16: Where the cases were reported – Rwanda*

Only about a sixth of the respondents who encountered bribery saw it fit to report the occurrences, with the majority of them reporting to the management of the of the institution concerned.

Only about a third of those who reported were satisfied with the action taken after reporting the bribery incidence while over six in every ten were disappointed as no action was taken at all to address their complaints.

**Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting the bribery incidence**



*Figure 17: Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting – Rwanda*

## Corruption Perception

This survey also sought respondents' perceptual observations on past, present and future corruption trends.

**Perceived current level of corruption**

Majority of respondents still believe that institutions in Rwanda are slightly corrupt with those believing that the institutions in Rwanda were not corrupt at all increasing from 3.6% last year to 12% this year. This tallies with the view that corruption had decreased in the last one year as 80.6% hold this view and an almost similar number of the view that corruption will decrease in the coming year.

*Figure 18: Perceived current level of corruption – Rwanda*



*Figure 19: Respondents' view on the current state of corruption compared to one year ago – Rwanda*

**Respondents' view on the incidences of corruption in Rwanda in the next one year**



*Figure 20: Respondents' view on the incidences of corruption in the next one year – Rwanda*

**Reasons for expected increase**

Only a very small portion of the sampled Rwandan public thought that corruption would increase in the coming year. Among the reasons they gave for their belief were that the public was afraid to report corruption incidences, ignorance and changed tactics in asking for bribes would contribute to the increase.

**Government's commitment to fight corruption**

When asked whether they thought that the government was doing enough to fight corruption, majority of those sampled responded in the affirmative. A majority of them cited the government's policy of zero tolerance on corruption and the government's efforts to sensitize the public about corruption as the reason for the positive review.



*Figure 21: Respondents' review of government's efforts to fight corruption – Rwanda*

This is the only positive review of government's efforts by the citizens in East Africa and it has improved with 2 percentage points from last year's review.

# Tanzania

## Sample characterisation

The survey sampled 2,017 households randomly picked across nineteen administrative regions in Tanzania.

| Region | Actual count | % |
|---|---|---|
| Arusha | 109 | 5.1 |
| Coast | 81 | 3.8 |
| Dar es Salaam | 332 | 15.5 |
| Dodoma | 122 | 5.7 |
| Iringa | 80 | 3.7 |
| Kigoma | 50 | 2.3 |
| Kilimanjaro | 135 | 6.3 |
| Lindi | 14 | .7 |
| Manyara | 89 | 4.2 |
| Mara | 127 | 5.9 |
| Mbeya | 154 | 7.2 |
| Morogoro | 69 | 3.2 |
| Mwanza | 266 | 12.5 |
| Njombe | 75 | 3.5 |
| Ruvuma | 73 | 3.4 |
| Shinyanga | 162 | 7.6 |
| Singida | 42 | 2.0 |
| Tanga | 114 | 5.3 |
| Unguja | 42 | 2.0 |
| **Total** | **2136** | **100** |

*Table 42: Sample distribution – Tanzania*

## Findings

### Aggregate Index

The police and the judiciary ranked as the most bribery prone institutions in Tanzania. However the police score was almost as twice as high as the judiciary.

| Rank | Sector | Aggregate Index |
|------|--------|-----------------|
| 1 | Police | 82.9 |
| 2 | Judiciary | 45.0 |
| 3 | City and local councils | 33.9 |
| 4 | Land services | 20.4 |
| 5 | Medical services | 20.2 |
| 6 | Regional administration | 19.3 |
| 7 | Educational institutions | 16.2 |
| 8 | Registry and licensing services | 15.7 |
| 9 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 14.6 |
| 10 | Tax services | 11.4 |

*Table 43:  Aggregate Index – Tanzania*

## Indicator Ranking

### Likelihood

The survey defined likelihood as the probability of a respondent being asked for or expected to pay a bribe when interacting with a particular sector in the preceding 12 months. Statistically, the indicator was derived as a number of all bribe demand situations registered in a sector a proportion of all the interactions registered in that particular sector. The indicator was ranged from 0 to 100 with the latter being the most adverse.

A respondent stood the highest chance of being required to pay a bribe when interacting with the police and the judiciary and lowest probability when interacting with tax authorities. The three most adverse institutions being law enforcement agencies create an implication that such services may not be accessible to ordinary citizens without encountering bribery.

| Rank | Sector | Likelihood (%) |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1 | Police | 64.4 |
| 2 | Judiciary | 53.7 |
| 3 | Regional administration | 48.4 |
| 4 | Medical services | 42.1 |
| 5 | Land services | 38.3 |
| 6 | Registry and licensing services | 36.1 |
| 7 | City and local councils | 35.4 |
| 8 | Educational institutions | 28.2 |
| 9 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 26.7 |
| 10 | Tax services | 25.7 |

*Table 44: Likelihood of bribe – Tanzania*

## Prevalence

Prevalence as an indicator measured the probability that a bribe would be paid to a sector upon interaction by respondents. The indicator was derived as the number of bribes recorded in a particular sector as a proportion of total number of interactions registered in that sector. Higher values indicated the seriousness of unofficial levies in a sector.

In Tanzania, the survey established that there was an almost 40% probability of having to pay a bribe each time a respondent interacted with the police. Interactions with the judiciary and the councils were faced with a similar situation. Though it was very likely for a respondent to be asked or required to pay a bribe while interacting with the provincial administration (48.4%), actual bribe payments were much lower at 17.9%. Compared to the police and the judiciary, the implication might be that the relative coercive power of the provincial administration is much lower.

| Rank | Sector | Prevalence (%) |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1 | Police | 39.1 |
| 2 | Judiciary | 28.7 |
| 3 | City and local councils | 21.3 |
| 4 | Registry and licensing services | 18.5 |
| 5 | Regional administration | 17.9 |
| 6 | Land services | 15.7 |
| 7 | Medical services | 15.0 |
| 8 | Tax services | 13.4 |
| 9 | Educational institutions | 12.4 |
| 10 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 5.3 |

*Table 45: Prevalence of bribery – Tanzania*

## Perceived Impact

This indicator captured respondents perception on whether they would have received the services they sought from a particular institution if they failed to pay a bribe. Perceived Impact as an indicator was only derived from among those respondents who reported having paid a bribe and received a service. It sought to bring out the value that the bribe payers had on the bribes paid as the only way to get the service.

Close to half of the respondents who reported having paid bribes to the judiciary and the police believed they would not have accessed services in the absence of the bribes. This is a very serious indictment to the two sectors in a country where a third of the respondents were in the lowest income group.

| Rank | Sector | Perceived impact (%) |
|------|--------|----------------------|
| 1 | Police | 48.4 |
| 2 | Judiciary | 42.4 |
| 3 | Medical services | 28.9 |
| 4 | Regional administration | 26.9 |
| 5 | Land services | 22.9 |
| 6 | Registry and licensing services | 22.2 |
| 7 | Tax services | 21.3 |
| 8 | City and local councils | 20.7 |
| 9 | Educational institutions | 15.3 |
| 10 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 14.7 |

*Table 46:  Perceived impact of bribery – Tanzania*

## Share of national bribe

This indicator reflects the proportion of bribes an institution accounts for relative to the total amount of bribes recorded by the survey in a particular country. It reflects the proportional culpability of an institution as measured by the amount of bribes received.

The two leading most bribery prone institutions claimed almost half (44%) of all reported bribes. Notably, though the educational sector fared well on other indicators, the proportion of total bribes going to the sector was relatively high at 15.5%. This may be traced to large bribes being paid by a select group of respondents. The assumption is that the services sought were of premium value demanded by this small proportion of respondents.

| Rank | Sector | Share of bribe |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1 | Police | 27.3 |
| 2 | Judiciary | 17.6 |
| 3 | Educational institutions | 15.5 |
| 4 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 13.6 |
| 5 | Medical services | 10.0 |
| 6 | Registry and licensing services | 6.9 |
| 7 | Land services | 3.5 |
| 8 | Regional administration | 2.9 |
| 9 | City and local councils | 1.5 |
| 10 | Tax services | 1.2 |

*Table 47:  Share of national bribe – Tanzania*

## Average size of bribe

This indicator captured the average bribe size per respondent. It was derived as a measure of how much on average each bribe payer had to part with to a particular institution. It is the arithmetic mean all bribes paid to an institution relative to all the respondents reporting having paid a bribe to that particular institution.

The city and local councils and the land services though ranked lower in other indicators registered high average bribe sizes perhaps as an indicator of the value attached by the respondents on the services offered. The police ranked lower on this score due to customary low but very frequent bribes.

| Rank | Sector | Average size of bribe (Tshs) |
|------|--------|------------------------------|
| 1 | City and local councils | 83,047.62 |
| 2 | Land services | 65,573.77 |
| 3 | Judiciary | 64,251.6 |
| 4 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 47,067.68 |
| 5 | Educational institutions | 44,893.15 |
| 6 | Police | 42,367.62 |
| 7 | Tax services | 38,694.44 |
| 8 | Registry and licensing services | 25,741.45 |
| 9 | Medical services | 17,644.95 |
| 10 | Regional administration | 16,908.81 |

*Table 48:  Average size of bribe – Tanzania*

**Reasons for paying bribes**

On probing why respondents paid bribes, 78.5% believed it was a sure way of getting services they would have not got or the only way to hasten service delivery. It is particularly alarming that 40% of the bribe paying respondents believed they could not have accessed the services if they did not part with bribes.

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| It was the only way to access service | 40.9 |
| To hasten up service | 37.6 |
| To avoid problems with authorities | 9.9 |
| To avoid paying full cost of service | 6.6 |
| To access a service I did not legally deserve | 3.7 |
| Others | 1.3 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 49: The most common reasons why bribes are paid – Tanzania*

## Corruption reporting

Despite the high incidence of bribery, the respondents seemed not ready to complain or report. Only 11% of the respondents who encountered bribery reported the issue to a relevant authority. This was an increase from 6.9% in 2011.



*Figure 22: The proportion who complained – Tanzania*

**Reasons for not reporting**

Majority of those who failed to report believed no action would be taken on such a report. When the 12% that did not know where to report and the 25.8% who did not see the need to report is factored in, a clear need to streamline reporting channels becomes evident.

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| I knew no action would be taken even if I reported | 40.6 |
| Did not occur to me that I should report | 25.8 |
| Didn't know where to report | 12.0 |
| Fear of intimidation | 9.1 |
| Fear of self-incrimination | 8.9 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 50: Reasons for not reporting – Tanzania*

## Where the cases were reported

Among those who complained did so to the management of the institutions (30.5%) followed by 18.9% who reported to the anticorruption authority. A big number (14.0%) also reported the cases to the police but given that the police were leading bribe takers, it may not have been effective. This can be seen from a majority (47%) where no action at all was taken after reporting while another 35.0% were totally dissatisfied. It can also be summed up by looking at the majority (40.6%) who reported that their reason for not reporting was that they knew that no action was to be taken.



*Figure 23: Where the cases were reported – Tanzania*

**Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting the bribery incidence**



*Figure 24: Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting – Tanzania*

## Corruption Perception

From a perceptual perspective, the survey sought to establish the respondents' views on the trends of corruption in the region. This information was captured based on perceived corruption levels, expected trends and the government efforts in combating the vice.

**Perceived current level of corruption**

The proportion of respondents who viewed Tanzania as an extremely corrupt society rose from 36.8% in 2011 to 48% in 2012. Those who perceived corruption levels as either slight or medium remained generally unchanged.



*Figure 25: Perceived current level of corruption – Tanzania*

**Respondents' view on the current state of corruption in Tanzania compared to one year ago**

A notable 52% of the respondents noted perceived corruption levels to have increased in the 12 months preceding the survey. This perception was further reinforced by an additional 28.4% who perceive the levels to have remained the same. The implication therefore is that four in every five Tanzanian respondent believes corruption levels either remained the same or increased in the last one year.



*Figure 26: Respondents' view on the current state of corruption compared to one year ago – Tanzania*

**Respondents' view on the incidences of corruption in Tanzania in the next one year**

The outlook into the near future is not positive given the combined 72% who believe corruption levels will either remain the same or increase in the next one year. This outlook is even grimmer given that two thirds of these respondents believe the levels will actually rise.



*Figure 27: Respondents' view on the incidences of corruption in the next one year – Tanzania*

## Reasons for expected increase

The high poverty levels were seen as the main reason why corruption is set to increase into the future. A fifth of the respondents also pointed out the perceived lack of political will by the government to tackle this vice.

| Reason | (%) |
| --- | --- |
| High levels of poverty | 35 |
| Lack of political will to fight corruption | 20 |
| Corruption is an accepted way of life | 18 |
| There is a lot of impunity | 15 |
| Others | 12 |
| **Total** | **100** |

*Table 51:  Reason for projected increase – Tanzania*

## Government's commitment to fight corruption

When asked if they thought that their government was doing enough to fight corruption, 47% of the respondents felt that it was not while 45% answered to the affirmative. This is a change from last year's perception where only 12% felt that the government was doing enough.



*Figure 28: Government's commitment to fight corruption – Tanzania*

Respondents who thought government efforts were below par mentioned the following reasons:

| Reason | (%) |
| --- | --- |
| The government is full of corrupt officials | 27 |
| Corruption is an accepted way of life | 28 |
| Lack of political will | 19 |
| There is nothing done to those who are corrupt | 15 |
| Other | 11 |
| **Total** | **100** |

*Table 52:  Reason for assessment – Tanzania*

# Uganda

## Sample characterisation

The survey was conducted at the household level among a sample population of 1,449 respondents randomly picked across Uganda's four administrative regions.

| Province | Actual Count | (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Central | 394 | 27.2 |
| Eastern | 367 | 25.3 |
| Northern | 301 | 20.8 |
| Western | 387 | 26.7 |
| **Total** | **1,449** | **100.0** |

*Table 53:  Sample characterisation – Uganda*

## Findings

### Aggregate Index

The aggregate index is a composite index resulting from the combination of the five different indicators of the survey. It serves to capture an overall reflection of the bribery pattern in an institution.

Just like in Tanzania, police and the judiciary ranked the top two bribery prone institutions in Uganda. Likewise, the gap in scores between the police and the judiciary are notably wide.

| Rank | Sector | Aggregate Index |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Police | 85.0 |
| 2 | Judiciary | 44.0 |
| 3 | Tax services | 32.5 |
| 4 | Land services | 26.9 |
| 5 | Registry and licensing services | 23.2 |
| 6 | City and local councils | 21.8 |
| 7 | Medical services | 20.7 |
| 8 | Educational institutions | 16.5 |
| 9 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 12.4 |

*Table 54:  Aggregate Index – Uganda*

## Indicator Ranking

### Likelihood

The survey defined likelihood as the probability of a respondent being asked for or expected to pay a bribe when interacting with a particular sector in the preceding 12 months. Statistically, the indicator was derived as a number of all bribe demand situations registered in a sector a proportion of all the interactions registered in that particular sector. The indicator was ranged from 0 to 100 with the latter being the most adverse.

The top seven institutions reported about 50% probability that as a service seeker you would be required to pay a bribe upon each interaction. This is quite an alarming state given the income profile of the average respondent is limited to the lowest income group.

| Rank | Sector | Likelihood (%) |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1 | Police | 61.4 |
| 2 | City and local councils | 54.3 |
| 3 | Judiciary | 49.6 |
| 4 | Registry and licensing services | 46.1 |
| 5 | Land services | 46.0 |
| 6 | Tax services | 44.4 |
| 7 | Medical services | 42.7 |
| 8 | Educational institutions | 26.7 |
| 9 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 24.2 |

*Table 55: Likelihood of bribery – Uganda*

### Prevalence

Prevalence as an indicator measured the probability that a bribe would be paid to a sector upon interaction by respondents. The indicator was derived as the number of bribes recorded in a particular sector as a proportion of total number of interactions registered in that sector. Higher values indicated the seriousness of unofficial levies in a sector.

It can be noted that the likelihood of being asked to pay a bribe was very high in the judiciary and councils, actual payments were much lower. The outcome for the police was consistent for the two indicators. It is likely the police and the tax services sector enjoyed higher stakes in securing the bribes as demanded.

| Rank | Sector | Prevalence (%) |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1 | Police | 48.2 |
| 2 | Tax services | 40.6 |
| 3 | Registry and licensing services | 34.0 |
| 4 | Medical services | 29.6 |
| 5 | City and local councils | 29.6 |
| 6 | Judiciary | 24.8 |
| 7 | Land services | 24.8 |
| 8 | Educational institutions | 12.4 |
| 9 | Utilities | 10.0 |

*Table 56: Prevalence of bribery – Uganda*

## Perceived Impact

This indicator captured respondents perception on whether they would have received the services they sought from a particular institution if they failed to pay a bribe. Perceived Impact as an indicator was only derived from among those respondents who reported having paid a bribe and received a service. It sought to bring out the value that the bribe payers had on the bribes paid as the only way to get the service.

For the police, tax and land services sector, about a half of the respondents who paid bribes believed the bribes were their only way to access the services. The perceived impact levels in Uganda were the highest in the region. This supports the overly negative perceptions on corruption in the country.

| Rank | Sector | Perceived impact (%) |
|------|--------|----------------------|
| 1 | Police | 54.0 |
| 2 | Tax services | 46.5 |
| 3 | Land services | 40.5 |
| 4 | Registry and licensing services | 39.6 |
| 5 | Judiciary | 36.6 |
| 6 | City and local councils | 35.7 |
| 7 | Medical services | 35.5 |
| 8 | Educational institutions | 24.2 |
| 9 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 21.5 |

*Table 57: Perceived impact of bribery – Uganda*

## Share of national bribe

This indicator reflects the proportion of bribes an institution accounts for relative to the total amount of bribes recorded by the survey in a particular country. It reflects the proportional culpability of an institution as measured by the amount of bribes received.

Half the total reported bribes were paid to the two law enforcement institutions of police and the judiciary. The medical and educational sector ranked quite high on this indicator. These two basic services sector have reported relatively lower ranking in share of bribe in the other countries.

| Rank | Sector | Share of bribe (%) |
|------|--------|--------------------|
| 1 | Police | 30.5 |
| 2 | Judiciary | 21.6 |
| 3 | Medical services | 13.3 |
| 4 | Educational institutions | 13.0 |
| 5 | Registry and licensing services | 6.5 |
| 6 | Land services | 5.9 |
| 7 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 5.2 |
| 8 | Tax services | 2.3 |
| 9 | City and local councils | 1.6 |

*Table 58:  Share of national bribe – Uganda*

## Average size of bribe

This indicator captured the average bribe size per respondent. It was derived as a measure of how much on average each bribe payer had to part with to a particular institution. It is the arithmetic mean all bribes paid to an institution relative to all the respondents reporting having paid a bribe to that particular institution.

The judiciary and land services attracted the highest actual amount of bribe per respondent. The extra and illegal levies on the judiciary in particular may result to lower access to judicial services and diminished confidence on the institution.

| Rank | Sector | Average size of bribe (Ugx) |
|------|--------|------------------------------|
| 1 | Judiciary | 594,137 |
| 2 | Land services | 235,250 |
| 3 | Tax services | 115,500 |
| 4 | Police | 105,512 |
| 5 | Educational institutions | 75,322 |
| 6 | Medical services | 73,142 |
| 7 | Utilities (water, electricity and postal services) | 53,539 |
| 8 | Registry and licensing services | 43,098 |
| 9 | City and local councils | 22,347 |

*Table 59:  Average size of bribe – Uganda*

**Reasons for paying bribes**

Going by the reasons for paying bribe, a majority (38.8%) held the view that it was the only way to access services. Consistent with other countries, the need to hasten the service being sought also ranked high at 25.8%. This situation reflects high discretion on whether to grant the service or decide the pace of service delivery and may strongly perpetuate the extortionist powers of the public officers.

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| It was the only way to access service | 38.8 |
| To hasten up service | 25.8 |
| To avoid problems with authorities | 15.4 |
| To avoid paying full cost of service | 13.6 |
| To access a service I did not legally deserve | 3.9 |
| Others | 2.4 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 60:  Reason for paying bribes – Uganda*

## Corruption reporting

Uganda also reported low rates of corruption reporting with a marginal proportion of 7.8% of the cases being forwarded to relevant authorities for action. There was a drop in the proportion of those who reported or complained from 9.9% in 2011 to 7.8% in 2012. Given that the police were one of the leading bribery prone institutions, this channel may not be effective. This can be further illuminated against a majority of the reported cases, 41.2% where no action at all was taken after reporting while 32.4% were totally dissatisfied with action taken on their reports.



*Figure 29: Corruption reporting – Uganda*

## Reasons for not reporting

The low level of confidence with the reporting channels in place are aptly captured by the large proportion of the respondents who mentioned that their failure to report was informed by a feeling that nothing would be forthcoming following their reports.

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| I knew no action would be taken even if I reported | 34.1 |
| Fear of intimidation | 17.6 |
| Fear of self-incrimination | 12.8 |
| Other | 12.3 |
| Did not occur to me that I should report | 11.7 |
| Didn't know where to report | 11.4 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

*Table 61:  Reasons for not reporting – Uganda*

## Where they reported

Among those who complained, 35.3% did so to the management of the institutions. This was followed by 23.5% who reported to the police.



*Figure 30: Where the cases were reported – Uganda*

## Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting the bribery incidence

Reporting of corruption cases might remain low based on the large proportion of the reports (almost half) that do not get acted upon. Capturing the 32% of the respondents who were dissatisfied, it means that three in every four of those who reported bribery incidents in the 12 months preceding the survey are likely not to report the same in future.

*Figure 31: Extent of satisfaction with the action taken after reporting – Uganda*

## Corruption Perception

The survey was also interested in capturing the perceptions on the respondents on the current and future trends on corruption in the country. The respondents were asked to gauge corruption levels relative to the previous and the coming year. Perceptions on government commitment on addressing the vice were also captured.

## Perceived current level of corruption

More than half of the respondents perceived that Uganda's public institutions as extremely corrupt, a position also held in 2011. This was further supported by a majority who observed that corruption levels increased from its status in 2011. There is, however, no hope for a decline in the corruption trend as more than half of the respondents perceived that corruption may increase further in the coming year.



*Figure 32: Description of the current state of corruption today – Uganda*

**Respondents' view on the current state of corruption in Uganda compared to one year ago**

Across the region, respondents in Uganda had the sternest perception on the corruption levels in their country. 82% of the respondents observed that corruption levels either remained as bad or increased in the last one year.



*Figure 33: Respondents' view on the current state of corruption compared to one year ago – Uganda*

**Respondents' view on the incidences of corruption in Uganda in the next one year**

Further to their negative perception on the current levels of corruption, respondents in Uganda maintained the most sceptical future outlook on corruption levels. 53% of the respondents believe corruption levels will deteriorate in the twelve months following the survey.



*Figure 34: Respondents' view on the incidences of corruption in the next one year – Uganda*

**Reason for projected increase**

The biggest reason put forward for the negative outlook to corruption levels was lack of political will to fight the vice at 33%, followed by 25% of the respondents who thought that the government officials in Uganda were too corrupt to effectively fight corruption.

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| Lack of political will to fight corruption | 33 |
| Government officials are very corrupt | 25 |
| High levels of poverty | 19 |
| It's an accepted way of life | 16 |
| Other | 8 |
| **Total** | **100** |

*Table 62: Reason for projected increase in corruption levels – Uganda*

**Government's commitment to fight corruption**

Finally the respondents were asked if they thought their government was doing enough to fight corruption. Only 22% of the respondents believed that their government was making an effort to fight corruption, a slight improvement from 2011's 15.8%. Those who felt that the government was not doing enough decreased from 61% in 2011 to 53% in 2012.



*Figure 35: Government's commitment to fight corruption – Uganda*

**Reasons for assessment**

Some of the reasons respondents thought that the government was not doing enough to fight corruption are listed in the table below:

| Reason | (%) |
|---|---|
| The government protects and defends the corrupt officers | 59 |
| There is no change, corruption is just increasing | 19 |
| Anti-corruption laws are relaxed and not strong | 17 |
| Other | 4 |
| **Total** | **100** |

*Table 63: Reasons for assessment – Uganda*

## EABI SURVEY - 2012

| Interviewer Name (CAPITALS) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interviewer Number | | | | Serial Number | | | |
| Interview Date (ddmmyy) | | | | | Start Time (24 Hour) | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |

| **Country** | |
|---|---|
| Kenya | 01 |
| Uganda | 02 |
| Tanzania | 03 |
| Rwanda | 04 |
| Burundi | 05 |

| Province | Code | Province | Code |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nairobi | 01 | Rift Valley | 02 |
| Eastern | 03 | Western | 04 |
| Nyanza | 05 | Central | 06 |
| Coast | 07 | NE | 08 |

| County | |
|---|---|
| District | |
| Town center / Village | |

| **D.1 Residency** | Urban | 01 | Rural | 02 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

Hello, My name is _____ and I am conducting a survey on behalf of Transparency International Kenya. The survey is on bribery and we are interested in your experiences. The interview will not take more than 30 minutes and your responses will be kept completely confidential.

| D.2 Gender | Male | 01 | Female | 02 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

D.3 Which of the following age groups do you belong to?

| 18-24 | 01 | 25-29 | 02 | 30-34 | 03 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 35-39 | 04 | 40-44 | 05 | 45-49 | 06 |
| 50-54 | 07 | 55-59 | 08 | 60+ | 09 |

| D.4 Employment Status | | D.5 Highest Level of education attained | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Student/Unemployed | 01/02 | Primary Only | 01 |
| Self employed | 03 | Post Primary Training | 02 |
| Employed in family business or farm | 04 | Secondary Only | 03 |
| Employed in private sector | 05 | College Education | 04 |
| Employed by government/local authority/ parastatal | 06 | University Degree | 05 |
| Employed in community sector e.g. Church, N.G.O,Co-operative | 07 | Postgraduate Degree | 06 |
| Retired | 08 | Informal education | 07 |
| | | No education | 08 |

| D.6  Personal Income  (Ksh) | | D.6 Household Income (Ksh) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Less than 10,000 | 01 | Less than 10,000 | 01 |
| 10,000 - 40,000 | 02 | 10,000 - 40,000 | 02 |
| 41,000 – 150,000 | 03 | 41,000 – 150,000 | 03 |
| More than 150,000 | 04 | More than 150,000 | 04 |

**Q1.0** Please tell me which of the following public institutions you have visited/ <u>interacted with personally</u> in the last 12 months, looking for services. **1.2** How many times did you interact with these institutions in the last 12 months? *(record numerically)*

| Institution category | Institution type | 1.2 Number of interactions |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Educational institutions- schools, colleges, universities | Primary | |
| | Secondary | |
| | Technical/vocational training | |
| | University | |
| 2. Judiciary | | |
| 3. Medical services | | |
| 4. Police | Regular | |
| | AP- Administration Police | |
| | CID | |
| | Traffic | |
| 5. Registry and licensing services (civil registry for birth, marriage death and business licensing; ID & passport issuance) | Civil Registration<br><br>Business licensing | |
| 6. Provincial administration | | |
| 7. Utilities (electricity, water, postal etc.) | Water | |
| | Electricity | |
| | Postal services | |
| 8. Tax services- (VAT, Customs, Motor vehicle licenses etc) | | |
| 9. Land services (buying, selling, inheriting, leasing) | | |
| 10. City and local councils | Specify town / city | |
| 11. Other, please specify | | |

Q2.0 When visiting these organizations/institutions/offices, did you encounter any bribery incidences? *(interviewer explain to respondent the demanded/expected/offered variables)*

| Demanded / expected | 01 | *Go to Q 2.1* |
|---|---|---|
| Offered | 02 | *Go to Q 2.1* |
| None - Not demanded / expected or offered | 03 | *Go to Q 4.0* |

| Institution category | Institution type | Bribe demand / expectation to pay | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Demanded/ expected (01) | Offered (02) | None (03) |
| 1. Educational institutions- schools, colleges, universities | Primary | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Secondary | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Technical / vocational training | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | University | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 2. Judiciary | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 3. Medical services | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 4. Police | Regular | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | AP- Administration Police | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | CID | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Traffic | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 5. Registry and licensing services (civil registry for birth, marriage death and business licensing; ID & passport issuance) | Civil Registration | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Business licensing | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 6. Provincial administration | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 7. Utilities (electricity, water, postal etc.) | Water | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Electricity | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Postal services | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 8. Tax services- (VAT, Customs, Motor vehicle licenses etc) | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 9. Land services (buying, selling, inheriting, leasing) | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 10. City and local councils | Specify town/city | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 11. Other, please specify | | 1 | 2 | 3 |

Q2.1 Did you pay the bribe?

Q2.2 Please tell me the total amount you paid in the last 12 months in each institution

Q2.3 Please tell me the number of times you paid the bribe in the last 12 months in each institution

| Institution category | Institution type | 2.1 Bribe payment | | 2.2 Total amount of bribe paid in 12 mths | 2.3 Number of times bribe was paid |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Yes (01) | No (02) | | |
| 1. Educational institutions- schools, colleges, universities | Primary | 1 | 2 | | |
| | Secondary | 1 | 2 | | |
| | Technical / vocational training | 1 | 2 | | |
| | University | 1 | 2 | | |
| 2. Judiciary | | 1 | 2 | | |
| 3. Medical services | | 1 | 2 | | |
| 4. Police | Regular | 1 | 2 | | |
| | AP- Administration Police | 1 | 2 | | |
| | CID | 1 | 2 | | |
| | Traffic | 1 | 2 | | |
| 5. Registry and licensing services (civil registry for birth, marriage death and business licensing; ID & passport issuance) | Civil Registration | 1 | 2 | | |
| | Business licensing | 1 | 2 | | |
| 6. Provincial administration | | 1 | 2 | | |
| 7. Utilities (electricity, water, postal etc.) | Water | 1 | 2 | | |
| | Electricity | 1 | 2 | | |
| | Postal services | 1 | 2 | | |

| Institution category | | Yes | No | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8. Tax services- (VAT, Customs, Motor vehicle licenses etc) | | 1 | 2 | | |
| 9. Land services (buying, selling, inheriting, leasing) | | 1 | 2 | | |
| 10. City and local councils | Specify town/ city | 1 | 2 | | |
| 11. Other, please specify | | 1 | 2 | | |

Q2.4 *(For those who did not pay)* Did you get the service after failing to pay the bribe?

| Institution category | Institution type | Service access | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Yes (01) | No (02) |
| 1. Educational institutions- schools, colleges, universities | Primary | 1 | 2 |
| | Secondary | 1 | 2 |
| | Technical/vocational training | 1 | 2 |
| | University | 1 | 2 |
| 2. Judiciary | | 1 | 2 |
| 3. Medical services | | 1 | 2 |
| 4. Police | Regular | 1 | 2 |
| | AP- Administration Police | 1 | 2 |
| | CID | 1 | 2 |
| | Traffic | 1 | 2 |
| 5. Registry and licensing services (civil registry for birth, marriage death and business licensing; ID & passport issuance) | Civil Registration | 1 | 2 |
| | Business licensing | 1 | 2 |
| 6. Provincial administration | | 1 | 2 |
| 7. Utilities (electricity, water, postal etc.) | Water | 1 | 2 |
| | Electricity | 1 | 2 |
| | Postal services | 1 | 2 |
| 8. Tax services- (VAT, Customs, Motor vehicle licenses etc) | | 1 | 2 |

| 9. Land services (buying, selling, inheriting, leasing) | | 1 | 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10. City and local councils | Specify town / city | 1 | 2 |
| 11. Other, please specify | | 1 | 2 |

Q 2.5 *(For those who paid)* Do you think you would have received service if you did not pay the bribe?

| Institution category | Institution type | Service after bribe payment | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Yes (01) | No (02) |
| 1. Educational institutions-schools, colleges, universities | Primary | 1 | 2 |
| | Secondary | 1 | 2 |
| | Technical/vocational training | 1 | 2 |
| | University | 1 | 2 |
| 2. Judiciary | | 1 | 2 |
| 3. Medical services | | 1 | 2 |
| 4. Police | Regular | 1 | 2 |
| | AP- Administration Police | 1 | 2 |
| | CID | 1 | 2 |
| | Traffic | 1 | 2 |
| 5. Registry and licensing services (civil registry for birth, marriage death and business licensing; ID & passport issuance) | Civil Registration | 1 | 2 |
| | Business licensing | 1 | 2 |
| 6. Provincial administration | | 1 | 2 |
| 7. Utilities (electricity, water, postal etc.) | Water | 1 | 2 |
| | Electricity | 1 | 2 |
| | Postal services | 1 | 2 |
| 8. Tax services- (VAT, Customs, Motor vehicle licenses etc) | | 1 | 2 |
| 9. Land services (buying, selling, inheriting, leasing) | | 1 | 2 |
| 10. City and local councils | Specify town / city | 1 | 2 |
| 11. Other, please specify | | 1 | 2 |

Q 2.6 *(For those who paid a bribe)* What would you say was the single most common reason why you paid the bribes?

| Reason for paying a bribe | |
|---|---|
| To avoid problems with authorities | 1 |
| To avoid paying full cost of service | 2 |
| It was the only way to access service | 3 |
| To hasten up the service | 4 |
| To access a service I did not legally deserve | 5 |
| Other (specify) | 6 |

Q 3.0 Did you complain/report **any** of the bribery incidences you experienced to any authority/person?

| Yes | 01 | *Go to Q 3.1 then Q 3.3* |
|---|---|---|
| No | 02 | *Go to Q 3.2* |

Q 3.1 If yes,to whom did you report /complain about the bribery incidence?

Q 3.2 why din't you report/complain about the bribery incidences you experienced?

| Q 3.1-to whom incidence was reported | | Q 3.2-Reason for not reporting | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Management of institution | 01 | Fear of intimidation | 01 |
| Police | 02 | Din't know where to report | 02 |
| Media | 03 | I knew no action would be taken even if I reported | 03 |
| MP,Chief ,councillor | 04 | | |
| Religious leader | 05 | Fear of self incrimination | 04 |
| Anti corruption authority | 06 | Did not occur to me that I should report | 05 |
| NGOs/CSOs | 07 | | |
| Other (specify) | 08 | Other *(specify)* | 06 |

Q 3.3 How satisfied were you with the action taken after you reported the incidence?

| Satisfied | Dissatisfied | No action was taken at all |
|---|---|---|

| 01 | 02 | 03 |
|---|---|---|

Q 4.0 How would you describe the current state of corruption in Kenya today?

| Not corrupt at all | Slightly corrupt | Corrupt | Extremely corrupt | Don't Know |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 |

Q 4.1 Comparing the current state of corruption in Kenya with one year ago, would you say corruption in Kenya has:

| Increased | Remained the same | Decreased | Don't Know |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 |

Q 4.2 Thinking about the next one year, do you think the incidences of corruption in Kenya will:

| Increase | Remain the same | Decrease | Don't Know |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 |

Q4.3 *(For those who think it will increase)* What makes you believe corruption will increase in future?

_____

_____

_____

Q 4.4 In your view, do you think the government of (*insert your country)*is doing enough to fight corruption in the country?

| Yes | Maybe | No | Don't Know |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 |

Q4.5 Why do you say so?

| | Reasons |
|---|---|
| 1. | |
| 2 | |
| 3. | |

## Respondent details

Thank you very much for your time. You have given us a lot of useful information. Occasionally my supervisor contacts people to see how the survey went. For this purpose, would you please fill in the following details?

| Name | |
| --- | --- |
| Telephone Number | |
| Email | |

Interviewer Declaration: I certify that this interview has been personally carried out by me with the correct respondent. I further declare that all the information is truthful and as told to me by the respondent. I understand that any discrepancy discovered during back-checking of this questionnaire will result in the cancellation of this interview.

.................................................................................................................... (Signed)

| Stop time (24 Hour) | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

FOR SUPERVISOR'S USE:

| Quality Control…(*Do not ask this question*) | |
| --- | --- |
| ACCOMPANIED | 1 |
| SPOT CHECKED | 2 |
| PHYSICAL BACK-CHECK | 3 |
| TELEPHONE BACK-CHECK | 4 |

Name…………..................……………………………………………………………

Signature………...............…………………………….Date……………………….

*For advice on corruption related cases contact the Advocacy and Legal Advisory Centres (ALAC):*

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